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Abstract
This thesis studies incomplete market economies. First from a normative perspective
in Chapter 1, then from a positive one in Chapter 2.
Chapter 1 studies optimal taxation in an environment where heterogeneous house-
holds face uninsurable idiosyncratic risk. To do this, we formulate a Ramsey problem
in a standard infinite horizon incomplete markets model. We solve numerically for
the optimal path of proportional capital and labor income taxes, (possibly negative)
lump-sum transfers, and government debt. The solution maximizes welfare along the
transition between an initial steady state, calibrated to replicate key features of the
US economy, and an endogenously determined final steady state. We find that in the
optimal (utilitarian) policy: (i) capital income taxes are front-loaded hitting the im-
posed upper bound of 100 percent for 33 years before decreasing to 45 percent in the
long-run; (ii) labor income taxes are reduced to less than half of their initial level, from
28 percent to about 13 percent in the long-run; and (iii) the government accumulates
assets over time reducing the debt-to-output ratio from 63 percent to −17 percent in
the long-run. Relative to keeping fiscal instruments at their initial levels, this leads to
an average welfare gain equivalent to a permanent 4.9 percent increase in consumption.
Even though non-distortive lump-sum taxes are available, the optimal plan has positive
capital and labor taxes. Such taxes reduce the proportions of uncertain and unequal
labor and capital incomes in total income, increasing welfare by providing insurance
and redistribution. We are able to quantify these welfare effects. We also show that
calculating the entire transition path (as opposed to considering steady states only) is
quantitatively important. Implementing the policy that maximizes welfare in steady
state leads to a welfare loss of 6.4 percent once transitory effects are accounted for.
The main determinants of credit limits are the rules that govern the ability of house-
holds to default on their loans and the risks that they are exposed to. Chapter 2 investi-
gates the quantitative relevance of these determinants using a version of the incomplete
markets life cycle model in which agents are allowed to default on their debt holdings
by declaring bankruptcy. I document that credit limits are positively correlated with
households’ income levels. I then show that the introduction of profile heterogeneity in
iii
the households’ income processes increases the correlation between income and credit
limits. This fact is consistent with the theoretical results established in a simple exam-
ple. I also show that proportional income punishments or a threshold level of income,
such that agents are only allowed to declare bankruptcy only for income levels bellow
that threshold, can also be used to generate such a positive correlation. Finally, the
main calibration results suggest an important qualification about heterogeneous income
profile models: the lower levels of uncertainty implied by these models lead to a severe
underestimation of the number of bankruptcy filings.
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Chapter 1
Optimal Fiscal Policy in a Model
with Uninsurable Idiosyncratic
Shocks
1.1 Introduction
How and to what extent should governments tax capital and labor income if they care
about individual income inequality and risk? We want to provide a quantitative answer
to this question. We, therefore, need a model that is able to generate realistic levels of
income inequality and uninsurable risk. Our approach in this paper is to numerically
solve a Ramsey problem in a quantitative general equilibrium model with heterogenous
agents and uninsurable idiosyncratic risk - from now on referred to as the standard
incomplete markets (SIM) model1.
The SIM model has been used extensively for positive analysis and been relatively
successful at matching some basic facts about inequality and uncertainty2. In this en-
vironment agents face uncertainty with respect to their individual labor productivity
1This type of model was originally developed and analyzed by Bewley (1986), Imrohoruglu (1989),
Huggett (1993), and Aiyagari (1994).
2Our calibration strategy is similar to the ones in Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Castan˜eda,
Dı´az-Gime´nez, and R´ıos-Rull (2003).
1
2which they cannot directly insure against (only a risk-free asset is available). Depend-
ing on their productivity realizations they make different savings choices which leads
to endogenous wealth inequality. As a result, on top of the usual concern about not
distorting agents decisions, a (utilitarian) Ramsey planner has two additional objec-
tives: to redistribute resources across agents, and to provide insurance against their
idiosyncratic productivity risk.
The study of optimal fiscal policy in the SIM model has focused, so far, on the
maximization of steady state welfare3. In contrast, we allow policy to be time varying
and the welfare function to depend on the associated transition path. We calibrate the
initial steady state to replicate several aspects of the US economy; in particular the
fiscal policy, the distribution of wealth, and statistical properties of the individual labor
income process. The final steady state is, then, endogenously determined by the path of
fiscal policy. The Ramsey planner finances an exogenous stream of government expen-
ditures with four instruments: proportional capital and labor income taxes, (possibly
negative) lump-sum transfers, and government debt.
Labor and capital income taxes are distortive, however, they can be used to provide
insurance and redistribution. The only uncertainty that agents face, in our environment,
is with respect to their labor productivities4. Hence, labor income is the only risky part
of the agents’ income. By taxing labor income and rebating the extra revenue via lump-
sum, the planner can reduce the proportion of the agents’ income that is uncertain
and effectively provide insurance. On the other hand, capital income is particularly
unequal, since the inequality of individual asset holdings is high, and by taxing capital
the planner can reduce the proportion of unequal income in total income and, this
way, provide redistribution. The effect of government debt is more subtle. Increasing
government debt the government crowds out capital which affects prices indirectly, in
particular reducing wages and increasing interest rates which leads to a less uncertain
3See, for instance, Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009), and Nakajima
(2010).
4Panousi and Reis (2012) and Evans (2014) focus instead on investment risk. One justification for
our focus on labor income risk is the fact that it is a bigger share of the total income for most agents
in the economy. The bottom 80 percent in the distribution of net worth have a a share of labor income
above 77 percent, in the 2007 SCF.
3but more unequal distribution of income. The optimal fiscal policy weighs all these
effects against each other.
We find that capital income taxes should be front-loaded hitting the imposed upper
bound of 100 percent for 33 years then decreases to 45 percent in the long-run. Labor
income taxes are reduced to less than half of their initial level, from 28 percent to about
13 percent in the long-run. The ratio of lump-sum transfers to output is reduced to
about a half of its initial level of 8 percent and the government accumulates assets over
time; the debt-to-output ratio decreases from 63 percent to −17 percent in the long-run.
Relative to keeping fiscal instruments at their initial levels, this leads to a welfare gain
equivalent to a permanent 4.9 percent increase in consumption.
Unlike the Ramsey problem solved for representative-agent economies, in this paper
we do not rule out lump-sum taxation. The optimal levels of distortive taxation are,
therefore, derived rather than imposed. Even though lump-sum taxes are available,
the planner chooses to tax both capital and labor income at positive rates, rebating
the associated revenue via lump-sum transfers. Relative to a system that obtains all
revenue via lump-sum taxes, such a tax system changes the composition of agents’
after-tax income, reducing the proportions associated with uncertain and unequal labor
and capital incomes and increasing the proportion of certain and equal transfer income;
providing insurance and redistribution. To clarify this point and to understand exactly
how the optimal policy reacts to changes in uncertainty and inequality we provide an
analytic characterization of the solution to the Ramsey problem in a simple two-period
version of the SIM model.
We decompose the average welfare gains of 4.9 percent associated with implement-
ing the optimal policy into three parts: (i) 3.7 percent come from the more efficient
allocation of aggregate resources due to the reduction of the distortions of agents’ de-
cisions; (ii) 4.9 percent come from redistribution - the reduction in ex-ante inequality;
and (iii) −3.7 percent come from the reduction in insurance - there is more uncertainty
about individual consumption and labor streams under the optimal policy. The optimal
policy implies an overall increase of capital taxes and a reduction of labor taxes. The
net effect on the distortions of agents’ savings and labor supply decisions is positive.
4The higher capital taxes decrease the proportion of the agents’ income associated with
the highly unequal asset income and lead to the redistributional gains. Finally, a lower
labor income tax leads to a higher proportion of the agents’ income to come from the
uncertain labor income, thus the negative insurance effect.
We show that disregarding transitory welfare effects can be severely misleading. To
make this point we compute the stationary fiscal policy that maximizes welfare in the
final steady state, which leads to a 9.8 percent greater steady state welfare than the
initial steady state. However, once transitory effects are considered, implementing this
policy leads to a welfare loss of 6.4 percent relative to keeping the initial fiscal policy.
Relative to the fiscal policy that maximizes welfare over transition it leads to a welfare
loss of 11.3 percent.
In order to illustrate the role of market incompleteness in our findings, we develop
the following build-up. We start from the representative agent economy and sequentially
introduce heterogeneity in initial assets; different (but constant and certain) individual
productivity levels; and, finally, uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk which adds
up to the SIMmodel. At each intermediate step, building on the work of Werning (2007),
we analytically characterize and then numerically compute the optimal fiscal policy over
transition identifying the effect of adding each feature. In particular, we show that the
planner will choose to keep capital taxes at the upper bound in the initial periods
if there is asset heterogeneity, before reducing it to zero. Productivity heterogeneity
rationalizes positive (and virtually constant) labor taxes. The key qualitative difference
of the solution once uninsurable idiosyncratic productivity risk is introduced is that
long-run capital income taxes are set to a positive level. Rationales for this result
already exist in the literature and are discussed in the next section. To our knowledge,
however, the level of the optimal long-run capital taxes in the SIM model had not been
obtained before.
Finally, we present robustness exercises with respect to the welfare function and the
calibration of the labor income process. Our benchmark results are for the utilitarian
welfare function which implies a particular social choice with respect to the equality
versus efficiency trade-off. We introduce a parameter in the welfare function that allows
5for different choices, in particular for the planner to completely ignore equality concerns.
The long-run levels of capital and labor taxes are surprisingly resistant to changes in
this parameter. What does change significantly, however, is how long the capital tax is
maintained at the upper bound; the more the planner “cares” about inequality the more
years it keeps those taxes at the upper bound. With respect to different calibrations of
the labor income process, the magnitudes of the taxes are affected, but the qualitative
features are maintained.
Related Literature
This paper is related to several strands of literature. First, it is related to the literature
on the steady state optimal fiscal policy in the SIM model. In an influential paper,
Conesa, Kitao, and Krueger (2009) solve for the tax system that maximizes steady state
welfare in an overlapping generations SIM model. Their result includes an optimal long-
run capital income tax of 36 percent. It is important to note that though this result
is similar to ours the reasons behind it are different. They diagnose that their optimal
capital tax level follows from the planner’s inability to condition taxes on age, and the
fact that a positive capital tax can mimic age-conditioned taxes in a welfare improving
way (see Erosa and Gervais (2002)). This mechanism is not present in our analysis since
we abstract from life-cycle issues.
Aiyagari (1995) and Chamley (2001) provide rationales for positive long-run capital
taxes in environments similar to ours. Aiyagari (1995)’s logic depends on the planner
choosing the path of government expenditure (appearing separably in the agent’s utility
function). The associated Euler equation implies the modified golden rule level of capital
which can only be achieved by taxing savings; the planner does not have precautionary
motives while the agents do. In our environment positive long-run capital taxes are
preserved with exogenous governmental spending. Chamley (2001) shows, in a partial
equilibrium version of the SIM model, that enough periods in the future every agent
has the same probability of being in each of the possible individual (asset/productivity)
states. It is, therefore, Pareto improving to transfer from the consumption-rich to the
consumption-poor in the long-run. If the correlation of asset holdings with consumption
is positive, this transfer can be achieved by a positive capital tax rebated via lump-sum.
6In short, an agent’s asset level in the long-run is a good proxy for how lucky she has
been; hence, taxing it is a good way to provide insurance in the long-run. In recent
work, Da´vila, Hong, Krusell, and Rı´os-Rull (2012) solve the problem of a planner that
is restricted to satisfy agents’ budget constraints, but is allowed to choose the savings
of each agent. If the consumption-poor’s share of labor income is higher than the
average, increasing the aggregate capital stock relative to the undistorted equilibrium
can improve welfare through its indirect effect on wages and interest rates. In our setup,
the Ramsey planner taxes capital to affect after tax interest rates directly and achieves
the same goal.
Another important work on fiscal policy in the SIMmodel is Aiyagari and McGrattan
(1998), who search for the level of debt-to-output that maximizes steady state welfare.
Interestingly, they find that the optimal level is very close to the pre recession level of
around 67 percent. The fact that they abstract from the transitional dynamics makes
the result even more remarkable: the government could chose its level of asset without
having to finance it over time, it could, for instance choose to have enough assets to
finance all its expenditures and yet it chooses to remain in debt. By holding debt, the
government crowds out capital increasing interest rates and decreasing wages. This
effectively provides insurance since the proportion of uncertain labor income out of
total income is reduced. This benefit is what drives the choice of the government to
hold debt. However, there is another effect associated with such a policy; it increases
inequality (the proportion of the unequal asset income out of total income increases).
This negative effect is not particularly important in Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998)
because their calibration focuses on matching labor income processes which leads to
an underestimation of wealth inequality. Winter and Roehrs (2014) replicate their
experiment with a calibration that targets wealth inequality statistics and find the
opposite result, i.e. the government chooses to hold high levels of assets. Our calibration
procedure is closer to that of Winter and Roehrs (2014), which elucidates our result that
the Ramsey planner chooses to accumulate assets over time.
Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) and Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima
(2014b) characterize the optimal fiscal policy in stylized versions of the SIM model.
Their approaches lead to elegant and insightful closed-form solutions. The environment
7and Ramsey problem in Gottardi, Kajii, and Nakajima (2014b) is similar to ours except
for the simplifications that yield tractability; i.e. exogenous labor supply, the absence
of borrowing constraints, and i.i.d. shocks to human capital accumulation. Heathcote,
Storesletten, and Violante (2014), on the other hand, focus on different, though related,
questions. By abstracting from capital accumulation, they are able to retain tractability
in a model with progressive taxation, partial insurance, endogenous government expen-
diture and skill choices (with imperfect substitution between skill types). This leads
to several interesting dimensions that, in our paper, we abstract from. However, the
simplifications in these models do not allow them to match some aspects of the data
which we find to be important for the determination of the optimal tax system. In
particular, the model in Heathcote, Storesletten, and Violante (2014) implies no wealth
inequality (wealth is zero for all agents). Our calibration strategy allows us to match
the distribution of wealth in the US.
We also contribute to the literature highlighting the importance of transition for
policy prescriptions in incomplete markets models. Domeij and Heathcote (2004) use
the SIM model to evaluate the implementation of a zero capital income tax policy taking
into account the transitional welfare effects. They conclude that such a reform would
be detrimental to welfare due to its transitory effect on inequality. Krueger and Ludwig
(2013), Poschke, Kaymak, and Bakis (2012), and Winter and Roehrs (2014) also conduct
experiments in this spirit. Acikgoz (2013) claims that the optimal long-run fiscal policy
is independent of initial conditions and the transition towards it. He, then, studies the
properties of fiscal policy in the long-run, but is silent about the optimal transition path
which is the focus of this paper.
There is an extensive literature that studies the Ramsey problem in complete market
economies; see Chari and Kehoe (1999) for a survey. The most well known result for
the deterministic subset of these economies is due to Judd (1985) and Chamley (1986);
capital taxes should converge to zero in the long run. Among others, Jones, Manuelli,
and Rossi (1997) and Atkeson, Chari, and Kehoe (1999), show this result is robust to
a relaxation of a number of assumptions. As was described above we make an effort to
relate our main results to the results in this literature.
8The New Dynamic Public Finance literature takes an alternative approach to an-
swer our initial question. It focuses on the design of a mechanism that would allow
the planner to extract information about the agents’ unobservable productivities effi-
ciently. It assumes tax instruments are unrestricted and in this sense it dominates the
Ramsey approach in terms of generality, since the latter ignores the information extrac-
tion problem5 and imposes ad-hoc linearity restrictions on the tax system. One of the
main results steaming from this literature is the inverse Euler equation; see Golosov,
Kocherlakota, and Tsyvinski (2003). Farhi and Werning (2012) show that starting from
the allocations from the steady state of an undistorted SIM model and applying per-
turbations to implement the inverse Euler equation leads to small welfare gains, of the
order of 0.2 percent. Moreover, it is difficult to solve the private information problem
in dynamic economies with persistent shocks. Farhi and Werning (2013) and Troshkin,
Tsyvinski, and Golosov (2010) have made advancements in this direction in partial equi-
librium settings and find that restrictions to linear taxes lead to small welfare losses.
Our view is that, even if only as a benchmark to more elaborate tax systems, it is useful
to understand the properties of a simpler optimal linear tax system in a quantitative
general equilibrium environment.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 illustrates the main mech-
anism behind our results in a two-period economy. Section 1.3 describes the infinite
horizon model, sets up the Ramsey problem and discusses our solution technique. Sec-
tion 1.4 describes the calibration. Section 1.5 presents the main results of the paper.
Section 1.6 presents the build-up from the complete market economy results to our main
results. Section 1.7 provides results for alternative welfare functions and calibrations
and Section 1.8 concludes.
1.2 Mechanism: Two-Period Economy
In the SIM model, there are two dimensions of heterogeneity: productivity and wealth.
Agents have different levels of productivity which follow an exogenous random process.
In addition, markets are incomplete and only a risk-free asset exists. Therefore, the
5The Ramsey planner is also unable to observe productivity levels, it is not allowed to condition
taxes on them.
9idiosyncratic productivity risk cannot be diversified away. It follows that the history
of shocks, affects the amount of wealth accumulated by each agent and there is an
endogenously determined distribution of wealth.
In a two-period economy, it is possible to evaluate how each dimension of hetero-
geneity affects the optimal tax system. Since there is no previous history of shocks the
initial wealth inequality can be set exogenously. In this section, we characterize, un-
der some assumptions about preferences, the optimal tax system when the government
has access to linear labor and capital income taxes, and (possibly negative) lump-sum
transfers. First, we assume agents have the same level of wealth but face an idiosyn-
cratic productivity shock - we call this the uncertainty economy . Then, we shut down
uncertainty and introduce ex-ante wealth inequality - this is referred to as the inequality
economy . Next we consider the case in which there is uncertainty and inequality and
discuss the relationship with the infinite horizon problem.
1.2.1 Uncertainty economy
Consider an economy with a measure one of ex-ante identical agents who live for two
periods. Suppose they have time-additive, von Neumann-Morgenstern utility functions.
Denote the period utility function by u (c, n) where c and n are the levels of consumption
and labor supplied. Assume u satisfies the usual conditions and denote the discount
factor by β. In the first period each agent is endowed with ω units of the consumption
good which can be either consumed or invested into a risk-free asset, a, and supplies n¯
units of labor inelastically.
In period 2, consumers receive income from the asset they saved in period 1 and
from labor. Labor is supplied endogenously by each agent in period 2 and the individual
labor productivity, e, is random and can take two values: eL with probability π and
eH > eL with probability 1 − π, with the normalization πeL + (1− π) eH = 1. Due to
the independence of shocks across consumers a law of large numbers operates so that
in period 2 the fraction of agents with eL is π and with eH is (1− π). Letting ni be the
labor supply of an agent with productivity ei, it follows that the aggregate labor supply
is N = πeLnL + (1− π) eHnH .
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The planner needs to finance an expenditure of G in period 2. It has three in-
struments available: labor and capital income taxes, τn and τk, and lump-sum trans-
fers T which can be positive or negative. Let w be the wage rate and r the inter-
est rate. The total period 2 income of an agent with productivity ei is, therefore,
(1− τn)weini +
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
a + T . In period 2, output is produced using capital,
K, and labor and a constant-returns-to-scale neoclassical production function f (K,N).
We assume that f (·) is net of depreciation.
Definition 1 A tax distorted competitive equilibrium is a vector (K,nL, nH , r, w;
τn, τk, T ) such that
1. (K,nL, nH) solves
max
a,nL,nH
u (ω − a, n¯) + βE [u (ci, ni)]
s.t. ci = (1− τ
n)weini +
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
a+ T ;
2. r = fK (K,N), w = fN (K,N), where N = πeLnL + (1− π) eHnH ;
3. and, τnwN + τkrK = G+ T .
The Ramsey problem is to choose τn, τk, and T to maximize welfare. Since agents
are ex-ante identical there is no ambiguity about which welfare function to use, it is
the expected utility of the agents. If there is no risk, i.e. eL = eH , the agents are
also ex-post identical and the usual representative agent result applies: since negative
lump-sum transfers are available, it is optimal to obtain all revenue via this undistortive
instrument and set τn = τk = 0.
In order to provide a sharp characterization of the optimal tax system we make the
following assumption discussed below6.
6In a similar two-period environment, Gottardi et al. (2014a) characterize the solution to Ramsey
problem without Assumption A. However, they impose an alternative assumption about endogenous
variables which are satisfied under Assumption A. Further, this assumption allows us to provide a
sharper characterization of the optimal tax system (besides the signs of taxes we also characterize the
levels).
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Assumption 1 No income effects on labor supply and constant Frisch elasticity, κ, i.e.
ucn − ucc
un
uc
= 0, and
uccun
n (uccunn − u2cn)
= κ.
We pursue a variational approach. Suppose
(
K,nL, nH , r, w; τ
n, τk, T
)
is a tax dis-
torted equilibrium7. We consider a small variation on the tax system
(
dτn, dτk, dT
)
,
such that all the equilibrium conditions are satisfied. Then, evaluate the effect of such a
variation on welfare, taking as given the optimal decision rules of the agents. Using this
method we establish the following proposition (derivations and proofs are in Appendix
A.1).
Proposition 1 In the uncertainty economy, if u satisfies Assumption A, then, the
optimal tax system is such that τk = 0,
τn =
(ν − 1) π(1 − π) (eHnH − eLnL)
(ν − 1) π(1− π) (eHnH − eLnL) + κN (πν + (1− π))
> 0, (1.2.1)
where ν ≡ uc(cL,nL)
uc(cH ,nH)
, and T < 0 balances the budget.
Notice that the planner could choose to finance G with T but chooses a positive
distortive labor income tax instead. The revenue from labor taxation is rebated via
lump-sum transfers and the proportion of the agents’ income that comes from the un-
certain labor income is reduced. Hence, this tax system effectively provides insurance to
the agents. Why not provide full insurance by taxing away all the labor income? This
is exactly what would happen if labor were supplied inelastically. In fact, notice that
in this case κ = 0 and equation (1.2.1) implies τn = 1. However, with an endogenous
labor supply the planner has to balance two objectives: minimize distortions to agents’
decisions and provide insurance. This balance is explicit in equation (1.2.1) seeing as a
higher κ implies a lower τn. That is, the more responsive labor supply is to changes in
labor taxes the more distortive these taxes are and the planner chooses a lower labor
tax. In the limit, if κ→∞ it will be optimal to set τn = 0.
With income effects on labor supply, distortions of the savings decision would spill
7Since the equilibrium does not exist for τn ≥ 1 or τk ≥ (1 + r) /r, we impose the restrictions that
τn < 1 and τk < (1 + r) /r.
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over to the labor supply decision and vice-versa. Thus, it could be optimal, for instance,
to choose τk so as to mitigate the distortion imposed by a positive τn. This complex
relationship complicates the analysis considerably. Assumption 1 unties this relationship
and as a result it is optimal to set τk = 0.
Next, suppose that eL = 1 − ǫ
unc/π and eH = 1 + ǫ
unc/ (1− π), so that ǫunc is a
mean preserving spread on the productivity levels. It is easy to see that if ǫunc = 0
equation (1.2.1) implies that τn = 0. The effect of an increase in ǫunc on the optimal
τn is not as obvious since the right hand side of equation (1.2.1) contains endogenous
variables. An application of the implicit function theorem, however, clarifies that as
long as ∂ν/∂ǫunc > 0 and ∂ν/∂τn < 0, it follows that ∂τn/∂ǫunc > 0, i.e. the optimal
labor income tax is increasing in the level of risk in the economy. Under standard
calibrations, the equilibrium ratio of marginal utilities, ν, is in fact increasing in the
level of risk (∂ν/∂ǫunc > 0) and decreasing in the labor income tax (∂ν/∂τn < 0), as
an example see section 1.2.3.
1.2.2 Inequality economy
Consider the environment described above only without uncertainty and with initial
wealth inequality. That is, suppose the productivity levels do not vary between agents,
i.e. eL = eH = 1, and that ω can take two values: ωL for a proportion p of the agents
and ωH > ωL for the rest, with ω¯ ≡ pωL + (1− p)ωH .
Definition 2 A tax distorted competitive equilibrium is (aL, aH , nL, nH , r, w;
τn, τk, T ) such that
1. For i ∈ {L,H}, (ai, ni) solves
max
ai,ni
u (ωi − ai, n¯)+βu (ci, ni) , s.t. ci = (1− τ
n)wni+
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
ai+T ;
2. r = fK (K,N), w = fN (K,N), where K = paL + (1− p) aH and N = pnL +
(1− p)nH ;
3. and, τnwN + τkrK = G+ T .
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In this economy the concept of optimality is no longer unambiguous. Since agents
are different ex-ante, a decision must be made with respect to the social welfare function.
In what follows, by optimal we mean the one that maximizes W ≡ pUL + (1− p)UH ;
the utilitarian welfare function. The following proposition follows.
Proposition 2 In the inequality economy, if u satisfies Assumption A and has CARA
is GHH as in equation (1.4.1), then the optimal tax system is such that τn = 0,
τk =
(
1+r
r
)
(ν − 1) p(1− p) (ωH − ωL)
(ν − 1) p(1− p) (ωH − ωL) +
ρ
ψ
(pν + (1− p))
> 0, (1.2.2)
where ρ ≡ 2+(1−τ
k)r
2+r for CARA, ρ ≡
1+β−
1
σ (1+(1−τk)r)
σ−1
σ
1+r+β
1
σ (1+(1−τk)r)
1
σ
for GHH, and ψ is the level
of absolute risk aversion8. T < 0 balances the budget.
The planner chooses a positive capital income tax which distorts savings decisions
but allows for redistribution between agents. The ex-ante wealth inequality is exoge-
nously given. However, agents with different wealth levels in the first period will save
different amounts and have different asset levels in the second period. This endoge-
nously generated asset inequality is the one the tax system is able to affect. A positive
capital tax rebated via lump-sum transfers directly reduces the proportion of the agents’
income that will be dependent on unequal asset income achieving the desired redistri-
bution which implies a reduction of consumption inequality.9
8The level of absolute risk aversion is endogenous is the GHH case.
9A related result was established in Da´vila et al. (2005). They show that the competitive equilibrium
allocation in the SIM model is constrained inefficient. That is, the incomplete market structure itself
induces outcomes that could be improved upon if consumers merely acted differently; if they used the
same set of markets but departed from purely self-interested optimization. The constrained inefficiency
results from a pecuniary externality. The savings and labor supply decisions of the agents affects the
wage and interest rates and, therefore, the uncertainty and inequality in the economy. These effects
are not internalized by the agents and inefficiency follows. Notice that the planner’s problem in their
environment is significantly different from the Ramsey problem described here. There the planner affects
allocations directly and prices indirectly whereas the Ramsey planner affects (after tax) prices directly
and allocations indirectly. In the inequality economy, for instance, Da´vila et al. (2005) show that there
is underaccumulation of capital. A higher level of capital would decrease interest rates and increase
wages, reducing inequality. A naive extrapolation of this logic would suggest that capital taxes should
be negative so as to encourage savings. This logic, however, does not take into account the more relevant
direct effect of the tax system on after tax prices. Proposition 2 shows that the opposite is true: capital
taxes should be positive.
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One of the key elements of equation (1.2.2) is the inverse of the coefficient of ab-
solute risk aversion, 1/ψ, which is proportional to the agents’ intertemporal elasticity
of substitution. This elasticity indicates the responsiveness of savings to changes in τk.
Hence, the higher this elasticity is the lower is the optimal τk, since providing redistri-
bution becomes more costly. The τn = 0 result is again associated with Assumption
1.
Assuming that ωL = 1−ǫ
ine/p and ωH = 1−ǫ
ine/ (1− p). The effect of an increase in
ǫine on the optimal τk can again be found by applying the implicit function theorem on
equation (1.2.2). It follows that, if ∂ν/∂ǫine > 0 and ∂ν/∂τk < 0, then ∂τk/∂ǫine > 0;
the optimal capital income tax is increasing in the level of inequality in the economy.
Under the assumptions of Proposition 2 it is possible to show that this will always be
the case.
1.2.3 Uncertainty and inequality
If both uncertainty and inequality are present, the optimal tax system has to balance
three objectives: minimize distortions, provide insurance and redistribution. A reason-
able conjecture is that under Assumption 1 the optimal tax system will be a convex
combination of the ones in Propositions 1 and 2, that is, positive labor and capital
income taxes with magnitudes associated with the levels of uncertainty and inequality
in the economy. A more subtle extrapolation of the results above points to another
interesting prediction associated with Assumption 1: the capital (labor) income taxes
should be invariant with respect to the level of uncertainty (inequality). We corroborate
these conjectures with a numerical example the results of which are in Figure 1.110.
The first row of Figure 1.1 shows the optimal tax system with the level of uncertainty
(embodied by the parameter ǫunc) in the x-axis with two levels of inequality: ǫine = 0
(solid line) and ǫine = 0.1 (dashed line). The solid lines corroborate Proposition 1. The
comparison between the dashed and the solid lines corroborates the conjectures made
10We use GHH preferences which satisfy Assumption 1. The most relevant interpretation of this
two-period economy is that each period corresponds to half of the working life of a person. Accordingly,
we set β = 0.9520 and δ = 1 − 0.920. Other parameters are set to satisfy the usual targets: σ = 2,
κ = 0.72, χ = 6, n¯ = 0.3, ω = 3.5, pi = p = 0.5, and f (K,N) = KαN1−α − δK with α = 0.36. G is set
to 0, but any other feasible level would just shift the lump-sum transfers correspondingly.
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above. The labor tax is increasing with the level of uncertainty and independent on
the level of inequality whereas capital taxes increase with the level of inequality and
are independent on level of risk. The second row of Figure 1.1 shows the results for
the analogous experiment with ǫine on the x-axis and ǫunc = 0 (solid) and ǫunc = 0.1
(dashed).
Figure 1.1: Optimal taxes in the presence of both uncertainty and inequality.
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1.2.4 Relationship with infinite horizon problem
The two-period examples are useful to understand the key trade-offs faced by the Ram-
sey planner, since they allow for the exogenous setting of the levels of uncertainty
(ex-post risk) and inequality (ex-ante risk). In the infinite horizon version of the SIM
model, however, these concepts are inevitably intertwined. The characterization of the
optimal tax system, therefore, becomes considerably more complex. Labor income taxes
affect not only the level of uncertainty through the mechanism described above, but also
the labor income inequality and the distribution of assets over time. An agent’s asset
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level at a particular period depends not only on its initial value, but on the history of
shocks this agent has experienced. Therefore, capital income taxation affects not only
the ex-ante risk faced by the agent but also the ex-post. Nevertheless, these results are
useful to understand some of the key features of the optimal fiscal policy in the infinite
horizon model as will become clear in what follows.
1.3 The Infinite-Horizon Model
Time is discrete and infinite, indexed by t. There is a continuum of agents with standard
preferences E0
[∑
t β
tu (ct, nt)
]
where ct and nt denote consumption and labor supplied
in period t and u satisfies the usual conditions. Individual labor productivity, e ∈ E
where E ≡ {e1, ..., eL}, are i.i.d. across agents and follow a Markov process governed by
Γ, a transition matrix11. Agents can only accumulate a risk-free asset, a. Let A ≡ [a,∞)
be the set of possible values for a and S ≡ E × A. Individual agents are indexed by
the a pair (e, a) ∈ S. Given a sequence of prices {rt, wt}
∞
t=0, labor income {τ
n
t }
∞
t=0,
(positive) capital income {τkt }
∞
t=0, and lump-sum transfers {Tt}
∞
t=0, each household, at
time t, chooses ct (a, e), nt (a, e), and at+1 (a, e) to solve
vt(a, e) = maxu(ct(a, e), nt(a, e)) + β
∑
et+1∈E
vt+1(at+1(a, e), et+1)Γe,et+1
subject to
(1 + τ c)ct(a, e) + at+1(a, e) = (1− τ
n
t )wtent(a, e) + (1 + (1− I{a≥0}τ
k
t )rt)a+ Tt
at+1(a, e) ≥ a.
Note that value and policy functions are indexed by time, because policies {τkt , τ
n
t , Tt}
∞
t=0
and aggregate prices {rt, wt}
∞
t=0 are time-varying. The consumption tax, τ
c, is a pa-
rameter12. Let {λt} be a sequence of probability measures over the Borel sets S of S
11A law of large numbers operates so that the probability distribution over E at any date t is rep-
resented by a vector pt ∈ R
L such that given an initial distribution p0, pt = p0Γ
t. In our exercise we
make sure that Γ is such that there exists a unique p∗ = limt→∞ pt. We normalize
∑
i
p∗i ei = 1.
12We could potentially allow consumption taxes to also be chosen by the Ramsey planner and it is
not without loss of generality that we impose this restriction. There are two reasons for this choice. The
first is practical, we are already using the limit of the computational power available to us, and allowing
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with λ0 given. Since the path for taxes is known, there will be a deterministic path for
prices and for {λt}
∞
t=0. Hence, we do not need to keep track of the distribution as an
additional state; time is a sufficient statistic.
Competitive firms own a constant-returns-to-scale technology f (·) that uses capital,
Kt, and efficient units of labor, Nt, to produce output each period (f (·) denotes output
net of depreciation - δ denotes the capital depreciation rate). A representative firm exists
that solves the usual static problem. The government needs to finance an exogenous
constant stream of expenditure, G, and lump-sum transfers with taxes on consumption,
labor income, and (positive) capital income. It can also issue debt {Bt+1} and, thus,
has the following intertemporal budget constraint
G+ rtBt = Bt+1 −Bt + τ
cCt + τ
n
t wtNt + τ
k
t rtAˆt − Tt, (1.3.1)
where Ct is aggregate consumption and Aˆt is the tax base for the capital income tax.
Definition 3 Given an initial distribution λ0 and a policy π ≡ {τ
k
t , τ
n
t , Tt}
∞
t=0, a com-
petitive equilibrium is a sequence of value functions {vt}
∞
t=0, an allocation X ≡
{ct, nt, at+1,Kt, Nt, Bt}
∞
t=0, a price system P ≡ {rt, wt}
∞
t=0, and a sequence of dis-
tributions {λt}
∞
t=0, such that for all t:
1. Given P and π, ct(a, e), nt(a, e), and at+1(a, e) solve the household’s problem and
vt(a, e) is the respective value function;
2. Factor prices are set competitively,
rt = fK(Kt, Nt), wt = fN (Kt, Nt);
3. The probability measure λt satisfies
λt+1 =
∫
S
Qt ((a, e),S) dλt, ∀S ∈ S
for one more choice variable would increase it substantially. Second, for the US in particular capital
and labor income taxes are chosen by the Federal Government while consumption taxes are chosen by
the states, so this Ramsey problem can be understood as the one relevant for a Federal Government
that takes consumption taxes as given. We need to add τ c as a parameter for calibration purposes.
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where Qt is the transition probability measure;
4. The government budget constraint, (1.3.1), holds and debt is bounded;
5. Markets clear,
Ct +Gt +Kt+1 −Kt = f (Kt, Nt) , Kt +Bt =
∫
A×E
at(a, e)dλt.
1.3.1 The Ramsey Problem
We now turn to the problem of choosing the optimal tax policy in the economy described
above. We assume that, in period 0, the government announces a commits to a sequence
of future taxes {τkt , τ
n
t , Tt}
∞
t=1, taking period 0 taxes as given. We need the following
definitions:
Definition 4 Given λ0, for every policy π equilibrium allocation rules X (π) and
equilibrium price rules P (π) are such that π, X (π), P (π) and corresponding {vt}
∞
t=0
and {λt}
∞
t=0 constitute a competitive equilibrium.
Definition 5 Given λ0, τ
k
0 , τ
n
0 , T0 and a welfare function W (π), the Ramsey prob-
lem is to maxpiW (π) such that X (π) and P (π) are equilibrium allocation and price
rules.
In our benchmark experiments we assume that the Ramsey planner maximizes the
utilitarian welfare function: the ex-ante expected lifetime utility of a newborn agent who
has its initial state, (a, e), chosen at random from the initial stationary distribution λ0.
The planner’s objective is thus given by
W (π) =
∫
S
E0
∞∑
t=0
βtu (ct (a, e|π) , nt (a, e|π)) dλ0.
In Section 1.7 we provide results for alternative welfare functions.
1.3.2 Solution method
We solve this problem numerically. Given an initial stationary equilibrium, for any
policy π we can compute the transition to a new stationary equilibrium consistent
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with the policy13 and calculate welfare W (π). We then search for the policy π that
maximizes W (π). This is, however, a daunting task since it involves searching in the
space of infinite sequences. In order to make it computationally feasible we impose the
following ad-hoc constraints: that each path {τkt , τ
n
t , Tt}
∞
t=1 be smooth over time and
become constant after a finite amount of periods. We denote the set of policies that
satisfy these properties by ΠR. These conditions are restrictive, but they allow the
problem to be solved and are flexible enough to characterize some of the key features
of the optimal paths of taxes.
The statement about the ad-hoc constraints must be qualified. It is well know
from the existing solutions to the Ramsey problem in complete markets economies that
capital taxes should be front-loaded. We obtain similar results in Section 1.6. Hence,
in defining the set ΠR we take this under consideration. That is, we allow capital taxes
to hit the imposed upper bound of 100 percent for the first t∗ periods, where a model
period is equivalent to one calendar year. Importantly, t∗ is endogenously chosen and
is allowed to be zero, so the fact that the solution displays a capital tax at the upper
bound for a positive amount of periods is not an assumption but a result. Other than
this, we assume that the paths for
{
τkt
}∞
t=t∗+1
and {τnt , Tt}
∞
t=1 follow splines with nodes
set at exogenously selected periods. The placement of the nodes is arbitrary, we started
with a small number of them and sequentially added more until the solution converged.
In the main experiment the planner was allowed to choose 17 variables in total: t∗,
τkt∗+1, τ
k
45, τ
k
60, τ
k
100, τ
n
1 , τ
n
15, τ
n
t∗+1, τ
k
45, τ
k
60, τ
k
100, T1, T15, Tt∗+1, T45, T60, and T100. In
the intermediate periods the paths follow a spline function and after the final period
they become constant at the last level. The choice of the periods 1, 15, 45, 60, and 100,
were a result of the fact that for experiments with less nodes, the optimal t∗ was always
close to 30, hence we placed the nodes at the same distance from each other except for
the last ones which are supposed to capture the long run levels14.
Solving the problem described above is a particularly hard computational task. Ef-
fectively we are maximizing W (π) on the domain π ∈ ΠR, where each element of ΠR
can be defined by a vector with a finite number of elements (the nodes described above).
13As long as the taxes become constant at some point.
14If the solver chooses t∗ close to one of these predetermined nodes the algorithm replaces that node
for t = 30. For instance, if t∗ = 43 the periods became 1, 15, 30, t∗ + 1, 60, and 100.
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We know very little about its properties; it is a multivariate function with potentially
many kinks, irregularities and multiple local optima15. Thus, we need a powerful and
thorough procedure to make sure we find the global optimum. We use a global optimiza-
tion algorithm that randomly draws a very large number of policies in ΠR and computes
the transition between the exogenously given initial stationary equilibrium and a final
stationary equilibrium that depends on the policy. Then, we compute welfare W (π)
for each of those policies and select those that yield the highest levels of welfare. These
selected policies are then clustered, similar policies placed in the same cluster. For each
cluster we run an efficient derivative free local optimizer. The whole procedure is re-
peated depending on how many local optima have been found and a Bayesian stopping
rule is used to figure out if enough global procedures have been run. A more detailed
description of the algorithm can be found in Appendix A.416.
1.4 Calibration
We calibrate the initial stationary equilibrium of the model economy to replicate key
properties of the US economy relevant for the shape of the optimal fiscal policy. Table
1.1 summarizes our parameters choices together with the targets we use to discipline
their values and their model counterparts. We use data from the NIPA tables for the
period between 1995 and 200717 and from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF).
15See Guvenen (2011) for a discussion of how to deal with such problems.
16The algorithm was parallelized for multiple cores. For each global iteration, we drew 131, 072
policies and computed the transition and welfare for each of them. The number of transitions run for
each cluster is endogenously determined by the local solver, on average it amounted to around 150
transitions to find each local maximum. A total of 8 global iterations were needed. We performed our
analysis on the Itasca cluster at the Minnesota Supercomputing Institute using 1024 cores.
17We choose this time period to be consistent with the one used to pin down fiscal policy parameters
which we take from Trabandt and Uhlig (2011).
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Table 1.1: Benchmark Model Economy: Target Statistics and Parameters
Statistic Target Model ParameterValue
Preferences and Technology
Intertemporal elasticity of substitution 0.50 0.50 σ 2.00*
Frisch elasticity 0.72 0.72 ν 0.72*
Average hours worked 0.30 0.30 χ 4.12
Capital to output 2.72 2.71 β 0.97
Capital income share 0.38 0.38 α 0.38*
Investment to output 0.27 0.27 δ 0.10
Borrowing Constraint
Households with negative wealth (%) 18.6 19.1 a −0.04
Fiscal Policy
Capital income tax (%) 36.0 36.0 τk 0.36*
Labor income tax (%) 28.0 28.0 τn 0.28*
Consumption tax (%) 5.0 5.0 τc 0.05*
Transfer to output (%) 8.0 8.0 T 0.08
debt-to-output (%) 63.0 63.0 G 0.15
Labor Productivity Process
Wealth Gini index 0.82 0.81 e1/e2 0.62
Percentage of wealth in 1st quintile −0.2 −0.2 e3/e2 3.89
Percentage of wealth in 4th quintile 11.2 10.2 Γ11 0.94
Percentage of wealth in 5th quintile 83.4 83.4 Γ12 0.05
Percentage of wealth in top 5% 60.3 60.8 Γ21 0.01
Correlation btw wealth and labor income 0.29 0.29 Γ22 0.92
Autocorrelation of labor income 0.90 0.90 Γ31 0.01
Standard Deviation of labor income 0.20 0.20 Γ32 0.04
Notes: Parameter values marked with (*) were set exogenously, all the others were endogenously
and jointly determined.
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1.4.1 Preferences and technology
We assume GHH preferences18 with period utility given by
u (c, n) =
1
1− σ
(
c− χ
n1+
1
κ
1 + 1
κ
)1−σ
, (1.4.1)
where σ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion, κ is the Frisch elasticity of labor supply
and χ is the weight on the disutility of labor. These preferences exhibit no wealth
effects on labor supply, which is consistent with microeconometric evidence showing
these effects are in fact small19. Further, they imply that aggregate labor supply is
independent of the distribution of wealth which is convenient for computing out of
steady state allocations in our main experiment. We set the intertemporal elasticity
of substitution to 0.5; the number frequently used in the literature (e.g. Da´vila et al.
(2012) and Conesa et al. (2009)). For the Frisch elasticity, κ, we rely on estimates
from Heathcote et al. (2010) and use 0.72. This value is intended to capture both the
intensive and the extensive margins of labor supply adjustment together with the typical
existence of two earners within a household. It is also close to 0.82, the number reported
by Chetty et al. (2011) in their meta-analysis of estimates for the Frisch elasticity using
micro data. The value for χ is chosen so that average hours worked equals 0.3 of total
available time endowment20. To pin down the discount factor, β, we target a capital
to output ratio of 2.72, and the depreciation rate, δ, is set to match an investment to
output ratio of 27 percent21.
The aggregate technology is given by a Cobb-Douglas production function Y =
AKαN1−α + (1− δ)K with capital share equal to α. The total factor productivity A
is set to normalize output per capita, Y , to 1. The capital share parameter, α, is set to
its empirical counterpart of 0.38.
18See Greenwood et al. (1988).
19See Holtz-Eakin et al. (1993), Imbens et al. (2001) and Chetty et al. (2012) for details.
20It is understood that in any general equilibrium model all parameters affect all equilibrium objects.
For the presentation purposes, we associate a parameter with the variable it affects quantitatively most.
21Capital is defined as nonresidential and residential private fixed assets and purchases of consumer
durables. Investment is defined in a consistent way.
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1.4.2 Borrowing Constraints
We discipline the borrowing constraint a using the percentage of households in debt
(negative net worth). We target 18.6 percent following the findings of Wolff (2011)
based on the 2007 SCF.
1.4.3 Fiscal policy
In order to set the tax rates in the initial stationary equilibrium we use the effective
average tax rates computed by Trabandt and Uhlig (2011) from 1995 to 2007 and average
them. The lump-sum transfers to output ratio is set to 8 percent and we discipline the
government expenditure by imposing a debt to output ratio of 63 percent also following
Trabandt and Uhlig (2011). The latter is close to the numbers used in the literature
(e.g. Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998), Domeij and Heathcote (2004) or Winter and
Roehrs (2014)). The calibrated value implies a government expenditure to output ratio
of 15 percent, the data counterpart for the relevant period is approximately 18 percent.
Further, we also approximate well the actual income tax schedule as can be seen in
Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: Income tax schedule
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Notes: The data was generously supplied by Heathcote et al. (2014) who used PSID and the TAXSIM program
to compute it. The axis units are income relative to the mean.
1.4.4 Labor income process
The individual labor productivity levels e and transition probabilities in matrix Γ are
chosen to match the US wealth distribution, statistical properties of the estimated labor
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income process and the correlation between wealth and labor income. There are three
levels of labor productivity in our model. Since we normalize the average productivity
to one we are left with two degrees of freedom. The transition matrix is 3× 3. The fact
that it is a probability matrix implies its rows add up to one, therefore we are left with
an additional six degrees of freedom. Thus, we end up with eight parameters to choose
It is common to use the Tauchen method when calibrating the Markov process for
productivities. This method imposes symmetry of the Markov matrix which further
reduces the number of free parameters. Following Castan˜eda et al. (2003) we do not
impose symmetry which allows us to target at the same time statistics from the labor
income process and the individual wealth distribution.
To match the wealth distribution we target shares of wealth owned by the first,
fourth and fifth quintile, the share of wealth owned by individuals in the top 5 percent
and the Gini index. The targets are taken from the 2007 Survey of Consumer Fi-
nances22. We also target properties of individual labor income estimated as the AR(1)
process, namely its autocorrelation and its standard deviation23. According to Domeij
and Heathcote (2004), existing studies estimate the first order autocorrelation of (log)
labor income to lie between 0.88 and 0.96 and the standard deviation (of the innovation
term in the continuous representation) of 0.12 and 0.25. We calibrate the productivity
process so that the Markov matrix and vector e imply an autocorrelation of (log) labor
income of 0.9 and a standard deviation of 0.224 (in Section 1.7 we provide robustness
results with respect to these choices). Finally, we target the correlation between wealth
and labor income which is 0.29 in the 2007 SCF data. This way we discipline to some
extent the labor income distribution using the wealth distribution that we match accu-
rately. The resulting productivity vector, transition matrix and stationary distribution
22For a general overview of this data see Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011).
23Including transitory shocks would allow a better match to the labor income process. However, these
types of shocks can, for the most part, be privately insured against (see Guvenen and Smith (2013)) so
we chose to abstract from them to keep the model parsimonious.
24We follow Nakajima (2012) in choosing these targets. The targets are associated with labor income,
wen, which includes the endogenous variables w and n. Therefore, to calibrate the parameters governing
the individual productivity process, the model must be solved repeatedly until the targets are satisfied.
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of productivities, λ∗e, are
e =


0.79
1.27
4.94

 , Γ =


.956 .043 .001
.071 .929 .000
.012 .051 .937

 , and λ∗e =


.616
.377
.007

 .
1.4.5 Model performance
Table A.1 presents statistics about the wealth and labor income distributions. We tar-
get five of the wealth distribution statistics, so it is not surprising that we match that
distribution quite well. Table A.2 presents another crucial dimension along which our
model is consistent with the data: income sources over the quintiles of wealth. The
composition of income, specially of the consumption-poor agents, plays an important
role in the determination of the optimal fiscal policy. The fraction of uncertain labor
income determines the strength of the insurance motive and the fraction of the unequal
asset income affects the redistributive motive. Our calibration delivers, without tar-
geting, a good approximation of the income composition. Finally, we also match the
consumption Gini which remained fairly constant around 0.27 in the period from 1995
to 2007 (see Krueger and Perri (2006)).
1.5 Main Results
The optimal paths for the fiscal policy instruments are portrayed in Figure 1.3. Capital
taxes should be front-loaded hitting the upper bound for 33 initial periods then decrease
to 45 percent in the long-run. Labor income taxes are substantially reduced to less than
half of its initial level, from 28 percent to about 13 percent in the long-run. The ratio of
lump-sum transfers to output decreases initially to about 3 percent, then increases back
to its initial level of 8 percent before it starts converging to its final level of 3.5 percent.
The government accumulates assets in the initial periods of high capital taxes reaching
a level of debt-to-output of about −125 percent, which then converges to a final level
of −17 percent. Relative to keeping fiscal instruments at their initial levels, this leads
to a welfare gain equivalent to a permanent 4.9 percent increase in consumption.
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Figure 1.3: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Benchmark
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition; The black dots are the choice
variables: the spline nodes and t∗, the point at which the capital tax leaves the upper bound.
1.5.1 Aggregates
The aggregates associated with the implementation of the optimal policy are shown
in Figure A.1. The capital level initially decreases by about 8 percent in the first 13
years, but then increases towards a final level 20 percent higher than the initial steady
state. The increase might be surprising at a first glance given the higher capital taxes.
First notice that, even if capital income taxes were set to 100 percent forever, there
would still be precautionary incentives for the agents with relatively high productivity
to save: if they receive a negative shock they can then consume their savings. The
decrease in government debt also contributes substantially to this increase - an effect we
explain further below in Section 1.5.4. Most importantly though, the level of aggregate
labor increases by about 15 percent immediately after the policy change following the
reduction in labor taxes, increasing the marginal productivity of capital.
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The higher levels of capital and labor lead to higher levels of output and consump-
tion, which increases by 15 and 20 percent respectively over the transition. The concomi-
tant increase in average consumption and labor has ambiguous effects on the welfare
of the average agent. Hence, we also plot in Figure A.1f what we call the average
consumption-labor composite, defined below in equation (1.5.1), which is the more rel-
evant measure for welfare. On impact the labor-consumption composite increases by 13
percent as the higher consumption levels (due to the initial reduction in savings) more
than compensate for the higher supply of labor. It then decreases for some periods
following the reduction in output and the increasing savings. In the long-run it returns
to a level about 13 percent higher than the one in the initial steady state.
1.5.2 Distributional Effects
Movements in the levels do not provide a full picture of what results from the imple-
mentation of the optimal fiscal policy. It is also important to understand its effects on
inequality and on the risk faced by the agents. Figure 1.4a plots the evolution of the
Gini index for consumption25. Notice that, though it takes some time for the reduction
to start, the consumption Gini is significantly reduced over the transition reaching a low
about 16 percent lower than the initial level. As will become clear below, this reduction
in inequality is behind most of the welfare gains associated with the optimal policy. Not
surprisingly, such a change would be supported by most agents in the economy with the
exception of the highly productive and, therefore, wealthier ones - see Table 1.2.
Figure 1.4b displays the evolution of the shares of labor, capital and transfer income
out of total income. Importantly, notice that the share of labor income is significantly
increased under the optimal policy. Since all the risk faced by agents in the SIM model
is associated with their labor income, it turns out that they face more risk after the
policy is implemented. This has an obvious negative effect on welfare which is, how-
ever, outweighed by the gains associated with the higher levels of consumption and the
reduction in inequality it provides. The next sections will clarify some of these issues.
25Since labor supply is proportional to productivity levels, the inequality of hours is unaffected by
the policy, it is in fact determined exogenously. Hence, here we can focus on consumption inequality.
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Figure 1.4: Inequality measures
(a) Consumption Gini
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Notes (a) and (b): Dashed lines: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid lines: optimal transition. Notes (b): Red
lines: labor income share; Blue lines: transfer income share; Green lines: asset income share
Table 1.2: Proportion in favor of reform
e = L e =M e = H All
99.6 98.3 3.7 99.5
1.5.3 Welfare decomposition
Here we present a result that will be particularly helpful for understanding the properties
of the optimal fiscal policy. First, let xt be the individual consumption-labor composite
(the term inside the utility function 1.4.1), that is
xt ≡ ct − χ
n
1+ 1
κ
t
1 + 1
κ
, (1.5.1)
and Xt denote its aggregate. The utilitarian welfare function can increase for three
reasons. First, it will increase if the utility of the average agent, U ({Xt}), increases;
we call this the level effect. Reductions in distortive taxes will achieve this goal by
allocating resources more efficiently26. Second, since agents are risk averse, it increases
26This is the only relevant effect in a representative agent economy.
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if the uncertainty about individual paths {xt}
∞
t=0 is reduced; we call this the insurance
effect. By redistributing from the (ex-post) lucky to the (ex-post) unlucky, a tax reform
can reduce the uncertainty faced by the agents. Finally, it will increase if the inequality
across the certainty equivalents of the individual paths {xt}
∞
t=0, for agents with different
initial (asset/productivity) states, is reduced; we call this the redistribution effect. By
redistributing from the rich (ex-ante lucky) to the poor (ex-ante unlucky), the tax reform
reduces the inequality between agents. In Appendix A.3 we give precise definitions for
each of these effects and show how it is possible to measure them. Then, letting ∆ be the
average welfare gain, ∆L the gains associated with the level effect, ∆I with the insurance
effect, and ∆R with the redistribution effect, we prove the following proposition.
Proposition 3 If preferences are GHH as in (1.4.1), then
1 + ∆ = (1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆R) .
Hence, it is possible to decompose the average welfare gains into the components
described above27. The results for this decomposition for our main results are in Table
1.3. Most of the welfare gains implied by the implementation of the optimal fiscal
policy come from the reduction in ex-ante inequality (redistribution effect). The also
substantial welfare gains associated with the reduction in distortions (level effect) is
almost exactly offset by welfare losses due to the increase in uncertainty (insurance
effect).
Table 1.3: Welfare decomposition
Average Level Insurance Redistribution
welfare gain effect effect effect
∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
4.9 3.7 -3.7 4.9
27The welfare gains described above are in terms of consumption-labor composite units. The decom-
position does not hold exactly in terms of consumption units. To keep our results comparable with
others, we report the average welfare gains in terms of consumption units and normalize the numbers
for ∆L, ∆I , and ∆R accordingly.
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1.5.4 Fixed instruments
In order to understand the role played by each instrument in the optimal fiscal policy,
we ran experiments in which we hold each of them fixed and optimize only with respect
to the others. Figures A.2, A.3, A.4, and A.5 display the solutions and Table 1.4 the
welfare decomposition for each of these experiments.
Capital taxes
It is clear from the welfare decomposition in Table 1.4 that the path of capital taxes
plays a crucial role in the redistributional gains associated with the unrestricted optimal
policy. Restricting capital taxes to their initial level brings the redistribution effect from
4.9 percent to −0.2 percent. In line with the result in Proposition 2, the increase in
capital taxes especially in the initial years leads to a strong redistribution effect as the
proportion of unequal asset income is reduced (actually brought to zero in the first
33 years). Relative to the optimal policy, the restriction on capital taxes also leads to
higher labor taxes (which explains the better insurance effect) and a lower accumulation
of assets by the government.
Labor taxes
Fixing labor taxes at their initial level is particularly detrimental to the level effect. In
the optimal policy labor taxes are reduced substantially and the labor supply distortions
reduced accordingly. The redistributional gains are virtually unaffected whereas the
insurance effect is improved, which is consistent with the result in Proposition 1 since
the restriction implies higher labor taxes. The fact that the insurance effect is still
negative might be surprising though. What is behind this effect is the role played by
the accumulation of assets by the government which we explain bellow.
Lump-sum transfers
Restricting lump-sum transfers to its initial level doesn’t affect the results as much as
the other restrictions; the average welfare gains are reduced from 4.9 percent to 4.4
percent. Most of the losses come from the reduction in the level effect. The restriction
leads to a higher overall level of transfers and, therefore, higher labor taxes relative
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to the unrestricted optimal policy whereas capital taxes are virtually unaffected. This
leads to an overall higher level of distortions which explains the lower level effect.
Table 1.4: Welfare decomposition: Fixed instruments
∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
Fixed capital taxes 1.0 3.7 -2.5 -0.2
Fixed labor taxes 3.3 0.0 -1.6 4.8
Fixed lump-sum 4.4 1.8 -2.5 5.1
Fixed debt 4.0 3.8 -3.2 3.2
Benchmark 4.9 3.7 -3.7 4.9
Government debt
In the absence of borrowing constraints an increase in government debt is innocuous, in
response agents simply adjust their savings one-to-one and the Ricardian equivalence
holds. In the SIM model, however, agents face borrowing constraints (which are binding
for some of them). The Ricardian equivalence breaks down and in response to an increase
in government debt aggregate savings increase by less than one-to-one. Since the asset
market must clear (i.e. At = Kt + Bt), it follows that capital must decrease as a
result. Hence, increases in government debt crowd out capital while decreases crowd in
capital28.
In order to understand why the government accumulates assets in the optimal pol-
icy it is important to look at its effect on equilibrium prices29. A lower amount of
government debt leads to a higher level of capital which reduces interest rates and in-
creases wages. Hence, besides the positive level effect associated with the higher levels
28See Aiyagari and McGrattan (1998) and Winter and Roehrs (2014) for an extensive discussion os
this issue.
29The fact that the government accumulates assets does not imply that it becomes the owner of part
of the capital stock. Agents own the capital, but on average owe the government (in the form of IOU
contracts) more than the value of their capital holdings.
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of capital such a policy also affects the insurance and redistribution effects. It effectively
reduces the proportion of the agents’ income associated with the unequal asset income
and increases the proportion associated with uncertain labor income. The result is a
positive redistribution effect and a negative insurance effect. Thus, when government
debt-to-output is held fixed the redistributional gains are reduced from 4.9 percent to
3.2 percent while the insurance loss is reduced from −3.7 percent to −3.2 percent. This
also clarifies why the planner chooses to accumulate assets when the instrument is not
restricted: the welfare gains associated with the resulting redistribution outweigh the
losses from the increased uncertainty.
1.5.5 Transitory effects
In this section we first compute the optimal fiscal policy ignoring transitory welfare
effects. A comparison with our benchmark results allows us to measure the importance
of accounting for these transitory effects. If the difference was small this would be a
validation of experiments of this kind performed in the literature. It turns out, however,
that the results are remarkably different. A better option, is to solve for the optimal
policy with constant instruments accounting for transitory welfare effects. The welfare
loss associated with holding the instruments constant, however, is still significant. The
results are summarized in Tables 1.5 and 1.6.
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Table 1.5: Final Stationary Equilibrium: Transitory Effects
τh τk T/Y B/Y K H r w
Initial equilibrium 28.0 36.0 8.0 63.0 1.65 0.33 4.1 1.14
Stat. equil. 18.0 - 3.7 -326.1 4.01 0.44 0.0 1.45
Stat. equil. fixed debt 4.7 -5.2 -5.4 63.0 2.84 0.43 1.9 1.26
Constant policy 7.6 73.7 3.5 49.8 1.31 0.36 7.1 1.01
Benchmark 12.6 45.1 3.5 -16.9 2.00 0.38 3.7 1.16
Notes: The values of τh, τk, T/Y , B/Y , and r are in percentage points.
Table 1.6: Welfare Decomposition: Transitory Effects
∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
Stat. equil. 24.7 19.6 -4.6 9.3
Stat. equil. fixed debt 9.8 18.8 -5.2 -2.6
Constant policy 3.3 3.4 -3.0 3.0
Benchmark 4.9 3.7 -3.7 4.9
Stationary equilibrium policy
Here the the planner chooses stationary levels of all four fiscal policy instruments to
maximize welfare in the final steady state. In particular, the planner can choose any
level of government debt without incurring in the transitional costs associated with it.
It chooses a debt-to-output ratio of −326 percent. At this level the amount of capital
that is crowded in is close to the golden rule level, that is, such that interest rates
(net of depreciation) equal to zero. Thus, taxing capital income in this scenario has no
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relevant effect and we actually find multiple solutions with different levels of capital taxes
which is why we do not display that number in Table 1.5. The average welfare gains
associated with this policy are of 24.7 percent, that is, agents would be willing to pay this
percentage of their consumption in order to be born in the stationary equilibrium of an
economy that has this policy instead of the initial stationary equilibrium. However, these
welfare gains ignore the transitory effects, it is as if the economy jumped immediately
to a new steady state in with the government has a large amount of assets without
incurring in the costs associated with accumulating it.
A more reasonable experiment, which is closer to the one studied by Conesa et al.
(2009), is to restrict the level of debt-to-output ratio to remain at its initial level. When
this is the case, the planner reduces labor taxes and capital taxes substantially obtaining
most of the necessary revenue via lump-sum taxes. This has detrimental insurance
and redistribution effects, but the associated level effect more than makes up for it.
The policy leads to a welfare gain of 9.8 percent relative to the initial steady state
when transitory effects are ignored. However, once transitory effects are considered,
implementing this policy leads to a welfare loss of 6.4 percent. Hence, ignoring transitory
effects can be severely misleading. Importantly, the transitory distributional effects of
the policy and the costs associated with the accumulation of capital (or assets by the
government) are ignored.
Transition with constant policy
Here we consider the problem of finding the constant optimal fiscal policy that maxi-
mizes the same welfare function we use in our benchmark experiment, in which transi-
tory effects are accounted for. We present a comparison with the benchmark results in
Figures A.7 and A.6. The level of capital taxes is close to average between the upper
bound of 100 percent and the final capital tax in the benchmark experiment. Labor
taxes are reduced from a long-run level of 12.6 percent to 7.6 percent and lump-sum
transfers converge much faster to the final level of 3.5 percent. The main difference
in the fiscal policy instruments is the fact that with a constant policy the government
is not able to accumulate assets via higher initial capital taxes. The debt-to-output
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ratio remains close to the initial level30. As a result of the higher long-run capital tax
and relatively higher debt-to-output ratio, capital decreases by about 20 percent in the
long-run whereas it increases by approximately the same amount in the benchmark
experiment. The associated higher interest rates and lower wages lead to the reduction
in the redistributional gains and reduces the insurance losses associated with the lower
labor tax. This policy leads to an average welfare gain of 3.3 percent whereas the time
varying policy increases welfare by 4.9 percent. That is, the restriction to constant
policies leads a welfare loss of 1.6 percent.
1.6 Complete Market Economies
To our knowledge, this paper is the first to solve the Ramsey problem in the SIM
environment. In order to provide further insight and relate it to other results in the
literature, we provide a build up to our benchmark result. First, we start from the
representative agent economy (Economy 1) and introduce heterogeneity only in initial
assets (Economy 2), heterogeneity only in individual productivity levels (constant and
certain) (Economy 3), and heterogeneity both in initial assets and in individual produc-
tivity levels (Economy 4). Introducing idiosyncratic productivity shocks and borrowing
constraints brings us back to the SIM model. At each step, we analyze the optimal
fiscal policy identifying the effect of each feature.
In what follows we examine the optimal fiscal policy in Economies 1-4. Their formal
environments can be quickly described by starting from the SIM environment delineated
above. Economy 4 is the SIM economy with transition matrix, Γ, set to the identity
matrix. and borrowing constraints replaced by no-Ponzi conditions. Then, we obtain
Economy 3 by setting initial asset levels to its average, Economy 2 by setting the
productivity levels to its average, e = 1, and Economy 1 by equalizing both initial
assets and levels of productivity. Figure 1.5 contains the numerical results.
30We do not restrict debt-to-output ratio to be constant in this experiment.
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Figure 1.5: Optimal Taxes: Complete Market Economies
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Notes: Dashed line: initial taxes; Solid line: optimal taxes.
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1.6.1 Economy 1: representative agent
To avoid a trivial solution, the usual Ramsey problem in the representative agent econ-
omy does not consider lump-sum transfers to be an available instrument. Since in this
paper we do, the solution is, in fact, very simple. It is optimal to obtain all revenue
via lump-sum taxes and set capital and labor income taxes so as not to distort any of
the agent’s decisions. This amounts to τkt = 0 and τ
n
t = −τ
c for all t ≥ 1. Since con-
sumption taxes are exogenously set to a constant level, zero capital taxes leaves savings
decisions undistorted and labor taxes equal to minus the consumption tax ensures labor
supply decisions are not distorted as well. In this setup the Ricardian equivalence holds
so that the path for lump-sum taxes and debt are indeterminate: there is no lesson to be
learned from this model about the timing of lump-sum taxes or the path of government
debt. This will also be the case in Economies 2, 3 and 4.
1.6.2 Economy 2: add heterogeneity in initial assets
Introducing heterogeneity in the initial level of assets we can diagnose the effect of this
particular feature on the Ramsey policies by comparing it to the representative agent
ones. We extend the procedure introduced by Werning (2007)31 to characterize the
optimal policies for this and the next two economies. We describe them in a proposition
leaving the proof to Appendix A.2.
Proposition 4 There exists a finite integer t∗ ≥ 1 such that the optimal32 tax system
is given by τkt = 1 for 1 ≤ t < t
∗ and τkt = 0 for all t > t
∗; and τnt = −τ
c for all t ≥ 1.
Once again, there is no reason to distort labor decisions since labor income is certain
and the same for all agents. However, the paths for capital taxes and lump-sum transfer
do differ from the representative agent ones. Proposition 2 provides a rationale for tax-
ing capital in this case; since agents have different initial asset levels, capital taxes can
be used to provide redistribution. This fact together with the fact that capital taxes are
31Werning (2007) solves for separable and balance growth path utility functions. Besides solving for
GHH preferences we also impose the upper bound on capital income taxes and remove the possibility
of time zero taxation.
32All propositions in this section are valid for any set of welfare weights, not only the Utilitarian ones.
The associated numerical results do assume a Utilitarian welfare function though.
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zero in the long-run determine the optimal path for capital taxes33. Capital taxes are
positive and front-loaded, hitting the upper bound in the initial periods subsequently
being driven to zero. The extra revenue obtained via capital taxation is redistributed
via lump-sum transfers (or a reduction in lump-sum taxes relative to the representative
agent level). It is important to reemphasize that since lump-sum transfers are an un-
restricted instrument, there is no reason to tax capital in the initial periods other than
for redistributive motives.
In order to have a sense of the magnitudes of t∗ and the increase in lump-sum
transfers, we apply the same procedure to the one we used to solve for the optimal tax
system in the benchmark economy. All we need to do is choose the initial distribution of
assets. The stationary distribution of assets in this economy is indeterminate34, hence,
we can choose any one we want. To keep the results comparable we choose the initial
stationary distribution from the benchmark experiment 35.
1.6.3 Economy 3: add heterogeneity in productivity levels
It turns out that the Ramsey policies for this economy are a bit more complex. Let Φ,
Ψ, and Ωn be constants (defined in Appendix A.2) and define
Θt ≡
Ct
Ωnχ κ1+κN
1+κ
κ
t
− 1.
The following proposition can be established.
33Straub and Werning (2014) show that capital taxes can be positive in environments similar to this.
The reason why their logic does not apply here is the fact that the planner has lump-sum taxes as
an available instrument. In particular, the proof of Proposition 4 does not impose convergence of any
Lagrange multipliers.
34For the preferences chosen above, consumption is linear on, and labor supply is independent of
the individual asset level. It follows that the equilibrium levels of aggregates are independent of the
asset distribution and equal to the representative agent ones (see Chatterjee (1994)). In a steady state,
β
(
1 +
(
1− τk
)
r
)
= 1 and, therefore, every agent will keep its asset level constant.
35In fact, a rescaling of it since the steady state aggregate level of assets is different when there is no
idiosyncratic risk (since there is no precautionary savings).
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Proposition 5 Assuming capital taxes are bounded only by the positivity of gross in-
terest rates, the optimal labor tax, τnt , can be written as a function of Θt given by
τnt (Θt) =
(1 + τ c)ΨΘt
ΦΘt +Ψ(σ +Θt)
− τ c, for t ≥ 1, (1.6.1)
with sensitivity
Θt
dτnt (Θt)
dΘt
=
σ (τnt (Θt) + τ
c)2
(1 + τ c)Θt
. (1.6.2)
It is optimal to set the capital-income tax rate according to
Rt+1
R∗t+1
=
τnt + τ
c
τnt+1 + τ
c
1− τnt+1
1− τnt
, for t ≥ 1. (1.6.3)
Since labor income in unequal, there is a reason to tax it, in order to provide redis-
tribution. Optimal labor taxes are not constant over time since they depend on Θt. If
they were constant, however, equation (1.6.3) would imply τkt = 0 for all t ≥ 2. Thus,
capital taxes will fluctuate around zero to the extent that labor taxes vary over time.
We disregard the upper bound on capital taxes, τkt+1 ≤ 1, because it would complicate
the result even further and in a non-interesting way. It could be that the bound is vio-
lated if the variation of Θt between t and t+ 1 is large enough. However, as discussed
below, quantitatively this is unlikely.
To obtain a numerical solution we set the productivity levels to the ones in the
benchmark economy and apply the same procedure. To have a sense of the magnitude
of the sensitivity of τnt to Θt we plug the initial stationary equilibrium numbers (τ
n =
0.221, τ c = 0.046, σ = 2, and Θ ≈ 2) into equation (1.6.2). This implies a sensitivity
of 0.06, i.e. a 1 percent increase in Θt changes the tax rate by 0.06 of a percentage
point, from 0.221 to 0.2209. We can then calculate the path of Θt, which we plot in
Figure A.8. Notice that the volatility of Θt over time is unsubstantial. It follows that
the optimal labor taxes are virtually constant and capital taxes virtually zero.
In any case, the fact that capital is taxed at all seems to be inconsistent with the
logic put forward so far. It is not, when labor taxes vary over time they distort the
savings decision, capital taxes are then set to “undo” this distortion. The analogous is
not the case in Economy 2 because of the absence of income effects on labor supply;
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distortions of the savings decision do not affect the labor supply.
1.6.4 Economy 4: add heterogeneity in both
The result for this economy is a combination of the last two.
Proposition 6 There exists a finite integer t∗ ≥ 1 such that the optimal tax system
is given by τkt = 1 for 1 ≤ t < t
∗, τkt follows equation (1.6.3) for t > t
∗; τnt evolves
according to equation (1.6.3) for 1 ≤ t < t∗; and τnt is determined by equation (1.6.1)
for all t ≥ t∗.
Optimal capital taxes are very similar to Economy 2 and for the same reasons. Labor
taxes are determined by the same equation as in Economy 3 for t ≥ t∗. In initial period,
1 ≤ t < t∗, while capital taxes are at the upper bound, Rt = 1 < R
∗
t and, therefore,
equation (1.6.3) implies that labor taxes should be increasing. Lump-sum transfers are
higher than the in Economies 2 and 3 since they are used to redistribute the capital and
labor tax revenue.36
1.7 Robustness
Figure 1.6 shows that the solution with 4 nodes (t∗,τkt∗+1,τ
n
1 , and T1) produces a rea-
sonable approximation for the benchmark solution, at least with respect to its basic
features. In this section, we make use of this fact, and present results for alternative
welfare functions and for different calibrations of the labor income process using these
4 nodes.
36Bhandari et al. (2013) solve recursively for Ramsey policies in an economy similar to Economy 4
with aggregate risk.
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Figure 1.6: Optimal Fiscal Policy with 4 nodes
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with 17 nodes
(benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with 4 nodes.
1.7.1 Welfare function
All the results presented so far used the same social welfare function: the utilitarian
one, which places equal Pareto weights on each agent. This implies a particular social
preference with respect to the equality versus efficiency trade-off. Here we consider
different welfare functions that rationalize different preferences about this trade-off.
With this in mind we propose the following function
W σˆ =
(∫
x¯ (a0, e0)
1−σˆ dλ0
) 1
1−σˆ
,
where λ0 is the initial distribution of individual states (a0, e0), x¯ denotes the individual
certainty equivalents of labor-consumption composite (given a particular initial state
(a0, e0)), and, following Benabou (2002), we call σˆ the planner’s degree of inequality
aversion. First notice that if σˆ = σ (the agents’ degree of risk aversion), maximizing
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W σ is equivalent to maximizing the utilitarian welfare function 37. If σˆ = 0, then
maximizing W 0 is equivalent to maximizing (1 + ∆L) (1 +∆I), that is, the planner has
no redistributive concerns and focuses instead in the reduction of distortions and the
provision of insurance38. Finally, as σˆ → ∞ the welfare function approaches W∞ =
min (x¯ (a0, e0)). Hence, by choosing different levels for σˆ we can place different weights
on the equality versus efficiency trade-off, from the extreme of completely ignoring
equality (σˆ = 0), passing through the utilitarian welfare function (σˆ = σ), and in the
limit reaching the Rawlsian welfare function (σˆ → ∞). Table 1.7 displays the results
for different levels of σˆ.
Table 1.7: Robustness: Welfare Function
t∗ τk τn T/Y B/Y ∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
σˆ = 0 0 34.7 12.2 0.0 79.8 0.58 5.32 -2.74 -1.80
σˆ = 1 19 49.9 10.1 2.9 -36.4 4.56 3.73 -3.83 4.81
σˆ = 2∗ 26 49.7 10.8 3.6 -62.5 4.64 2.97 -3.84 5.68
σˆ = 3 29 49.8 10.4 3.5 -76.8 4.64 2.90 -4.01 5.94
σˆ = 4 30 48.9 11.5 4.1 -76.0 4.61 2.52 -3.78 6.05
σˆ = 5 32 49.2 11.3 4.0 -84.2 4.59 2.45 -3.88 6.21
Notes: (*) When σˆ = 2 = σ the welfare function is utilitarian, this is the solution plotted in
Figure 1.6. The values for T/Y and B/Y are the ones from the final steady state. For the welfare
decomposition we use the utilitarian welfare function for comparability.
When σˆ = 0 the planner has no redistributive motive and, accordingly, t∗ = 0 which
is consistent with the results displayed above, in particular in Section 1.6. The bench-
mark result that capital taxes should be held fixed at the upper bound for the initial
periods is inherently linked to the redistributive motive of the planner. It follows that
higher σˆ imply higher t∗’s (lower lump-sum-to-output ratios and higher debt-to-output
37Notice that
(∫
x¯ (a0, e0)
1−σ dλ0
) 1
1−σ is a monotonic transformation of
∫
x¯(a0,e0)
1−σ
1−σ
dλ0, which is
equivalent to the utilitarian welfare function.
38This result can be established following a similar procedure to the one used in proof of Proposition
3. The online appendix contains the proof.
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ratios). Otherwise, overall, specially for σˆ ≥ 1, the results do not change significantly
with changes in σˆ. In particular, the final levels of capital and labor taxes are remarkably
similar.
1.7.2 Labor income process
The labor income process (summarized by the Markov matrix, Γ, and the vector of
productivity levels, e) is a key determinant of the amount of uncertainty and inequality
faced by agents in the economy. These parameters are a discrete approximation for a
continuous process for labor income, lit ≡ wetnt, that is
log (lit+1) = ρ log (lit) + ε, where ε ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
.
In our benchmark calibration we target ρ = 0.9 and σε = 0.2. Given the importance of
these choices for our results and the lack of consensus in the literature about them (see
Section 1.4.4 for a discussion), we provide here the results for alternative numbers for ρ
and σε. For each of these we recalibrate the economy modifying only the corresponding
target, Table 1.8 contains the results.
Table 1.8: Robustness: Labor income process
t∗ τk τn T/Y B/Y ∆ ∆L ∆I ∆R
ρ = 0.85 24 34.8 4.8 0.0 -100.2 5.43 4.81 -3.72 4.48
ρ = 0.95 21 42.8 11.5 3.7 -49.5 3.91 3.63 -3.35 3.74
σε = 0.15 28 28.1 4.9 0.1 -126.3 5.64 4.59 -4.09 5.31
σε = 0.25 34 57.8 11.6 4.7 -75.9 4.52 2.51 -4.29 6.52
Benchmark 26 49.7 10.8 3.6 -62.5 4.64 2.97 -3.84 5.68
Notes: The values for T/Y and B/Y are the ones from the final steady state.
As one would expect, the magnitudes of the results do change considerably given
changes in these important parameters. However, reassuringly, the qualitative features
44
of the fiscal policy instruments and of where the welfare gains come from is not sub-
stantially affected.
1.8 Conclusion
In this paper we quantitatively characterize the solution to the Ramsey problem in
the standard incomplete market model. We find that even though the planner has
the ability to obtain all revenue via undistortive lump-sum taxes, it chooses instead
to tax capital income heavily and labor income to a lesser extent. Moreover, we show
that it is beneficial for the government to accumulate assets over time. With a welfare
decomposition we diagnose that, relative to the current US tax system, this policy
leads to an overall reduction of the distortions of agent’s decisions, to a substantial
amount of redistribution and to a reduction in the amount of insurance provided by the
government. Importantly, we also show that disregarding the transitory dynamics and
focusing only on steady states can lead to severely misleading results.
Finally, we do not view our results as a final answer to our initial question: to what
extent should governments use fiscal policy instruments to provide redistribution and
insurance? Instead, we understand it as a contribution to the debate. The model we use
abstracts from important aspects of reality, as any useful model must, and we miss some
important dimensions. For instance, in the model studied above an agent’s productivity
is entirely a matter of luck, it would be interesting to understand the effects of allowing
for human capital accumulation. We also assume the government has the ability to fully
commit to future policies, relaxing this assumption could lead to interesting insights.
Chapter 2
A Study of Unsecured Credit
Limits and its Determinants
2.1 Introduction
Credit limits are an important determinant of household’s consumption and savings
behavior1. In turn, what determines credit limits are the rules that govern the ability of
households to default on their loans and the risks that they are exposed to. If households
could default without any constraint or punishment they would not be able to borrow
at all. On the other hand, if defaulting was never allowed and households faced no risk,
they would be able to borrow up to the present value of their future income. When
households are exposed to income or other types of risk and default possibilities and
punishments are less stylized this calculation becomes more involved.
This paper investigates the quantitative relevance of the key determinants of unse-
cured consumer credit limits in the US2. I use a version of the incomplete markets life
cycle model in which agents are allowed to default on their debt holdings by declaring
bankruptcy. It follows that credit limits in the model are endogenously determined.
The parameters that determine the punishments for declaring bankruptcy and in which
1See, for instance, Scheinkman and Weiss (1986), Deaton (1991), and Carroll (2001).
2Limits on secured credit are mostly determined by the value of the asset that a household is borrow-
ing against. This paper abstracts from this type of borrowing altogether focusing instead on unsecured
credit limits.
45
46
circumstances the households are able to do it have important effects on credit limits.
However, they are somewhat subjective and, therefore, difficult to discipline directly. In
the literature they are usually calibrated to match the data’s debt-to-income ratio. This
procedure leads to a wide range of results. An important contribution of this paper is
to suggest a new disciplining target and explain how it can help identify the bankruptcy
parameters. The new target is the relationship between income levels and credit limits.
More precisely, I document, using data for the Survey of Consumer Finances, that a 1
percent increase in income leads to a 0.7 increase in credit limits (controlling for other
individual characteristics).
The household’s income process is not subject to calibration in this paper. Instead,
I take them as given, estimated directly from data. I argue, however, that the type of
income process that households face, in particular whether the process allows for profile
heterogeneity or not, has important effects on credit limits. By profile heterogeneity
I mean households having different income growth rates which they learn about over
their lives. To understand this, suppose, for instance, that the only punishment for
declaring bankruptcy is that the household is not allowed to borrow for a number
of periods. If the households face the same income process (with a persistent and a
transitory component), then following a positive income shock reversion to the mean
implies that income is expected to fall (or increase less) in future periods and, therefore,
the household expects to want to save more (or borrow less) than if it had received
a negative income shock. It follows that positive income shocks reduce the relevance
of the punishment and, on average households with higher income (who accumulated
positive income shocks) are more likely to declare bankruptcy and, therefore, face lower
credit limits, which contradicts the pattern observed in the data.
I provide a simple example that allows me to clarify this point. Then, I use it to
show how the introduction of profile heterogeneity is able to mitigate this problem. I,
then, move to analyzing the effects of adding additional punishments. One additional
punishment commonly used in the literature is that households lose a proportion of
their income when they choose to declare bankruptcy. This implies that agents with
higher income levels face harsher punishments and are, therefore, less likely to default
and face higher credit limits.
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I argue that an important feature of the bankruptcy law, which is usually disregarded
is the fact that not everyone who files is granted bankruptcy. The decision is ultimately
made by a judge who will evaluate whether or not it is ”feasible” for the household
to make its payments. I model this by including a forward looking constraint on the
ability to declare bankruptcy: households that while paying back their loans are still
able to maintain a level of consumption above a certain threshold in the future will
not be granted bankruptcy. It should be evident that such a rule could also generate
a positive relationship between income and credit limits since agents with high enough
expected future income (usually those with current high income) are simply not allowed
to default on their loans.
I, then, perform comparative statics experiments to understand and quantify the
effects on credit limit of movements in the proportional income costs to bankruptcy
and threshold levels of income, in particular on its correlation with income. I find that
for all bankruptcy systems analyzed the correlation between credit limits and income is
higher under the assumption of heterogeneity of income profiles. Higher proportional
income punishments lead to a higher correlation as well, and the model matches the
data in this respect with relatively small levels of proportional income costs, 2.6 percent
without and 1.4 percent with profile heterogeneity (over 10 years). These numbers are
small relative to others obtained in the literature; for instance, Livshits et al. (2007)
estimate this number to be 35.5 percent (over 3 years) while Chatterjee et al. (2007)
find it to be 3.5 percent (over 10 years). The wide range of estimates gives more reason
to the search for additional disciplining targets. The calibrated threshold income levels,
are 24 percent of average income with profile heterogeneity and 30 percent without it.
Finally, I calibrate the bankruptcy parameters targeting key statistics about unse-
cured consumer credit and bankruptcy filings3 and find that it performs relatively well
with one important caveat: the HIP model underestimates the number of bankruptcy
filings by a factor of 10. This is an important failure and can be viewed as a problem
for the HIP literature. One of the main findings in this literature is that once profile
3Namely, the wealth-to-income ratio, the debt-to-income ratio, the percentage of households who
declare bankruptcy, and the percentage of those that declare for reasons other than shocks to income.
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heterogeneity is allowed the models are able to generate the variance in income of house-
holds with significantly less risk. A large part of this variance is shown to be due to
differences in income profiles which the households know a lot about. With these levels
of risk the model severally underestimates the number of bankruptcy filings.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2.2 I present a simple example that
allows me to explain the main mechanisms behind the results. Section 2.3 describes
the quantitative version of the model. I describe and discuss the parametrization of
the model in Section 2.4. In Section 2.5 I present the comparative statics experiment.
Section 2.6 contains the comparison between model results and data and Section 2.7
concludes. All proofs are given in the Appendix.
2.2 Mechanism
In this section I discuss three ways to obtain, with a standard incomplete markets
model, the positive correlation between income and credit limits observed in the data
(see Section 2.6.1). Somewhat surprisingly, if all households face the same income
process with a persistent component and the only punishment for declaring bankruptcy
is the loss of the ability to borrow, the model is likely to predict a negative correlation.
I start by introducing a simple example that allows me to clarify this point. Then, I
show that if the households face profile heterogeneity with potentially different growth
rates of income, which they learn about over time, the model is more likely to predict
a positive correlation between income and credit limits. An alternative way to achieve
the same goal, one that is frequently used in the literature (e.g. Chatterjee et al. (2007),
Livshits et al. (2007), Gordon (2015)), is to impose an extra punishment to declaring
bankruptcy. Namely that, in addition to losing the ability to borrow, households also
lose a proportion of their income. A third option is to restrict the ability to declare
bankruptcy of households with higher income levels. After the discussion of these three
alternatives I study their quantitative relevance in a less stylized version of the model.
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2.2.1 Example
Consider an economy with a continuum of ex-ante identical households who live for three
periods: 1, 2 and 3. Suppose they share time-separable von Neumann-Morgenstern
preferences with period utility u (c), where c denotes their consumption level, and let
β denote their discount factor. For tractability, in this section, I assume that u (c) =
− exp (−αc), where α is the level constant absolute risk aversion, and that β (1 + r) = 1,
where r is the exogenous risk-free interest rate.
In each period, households receive an exogenous random income of yt, which follows
yit = θ
it + zit. The value of the trend θ
i is initially unknown and independently drawn
from N
(
0, σ2θ
)
, and zit is a persistent shock, with z
i
t+1 = ρz
i
t + η
i
t+1, η
i
t+1 ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
,
ρ ∈ (0, 1), and zi0 = 0.
4 In each period, households observe their level of income yit,
but not its components θit and zit. Beliefs about θ
i and zit are updated following each
observation of yit according to Bayes rule.
In periods 1 and 2, households are only allowed to trade an asset, at+1, its price
denoted by qt+1. Trading occurs between households and financial intermediaries who
have access to an outside market where they can borrow or lend at the risk-free rate of
r. There is no information asymmetry. Financial intermediaries observe income levels
and form beliefs in the same way households do.
In period 1, households can, given q2 (a2, y1), borrow or lend without any con-
straints. In period 2 they are allowed to declare bankruptcy, in which case any amount
of debt that they hold is discharged. Then, households can once again choose how
much to borrow or save, except that households who have declared bankruptcy are
not allowed to borrow. In period 3, households simply consume their cash-in-hand
(y3 + a3); bankruptcy is not allowed in this period. In each period trading occurs after
the observation of income levels.
There is perfect competition between financial intermediaries, so that their trading
4The fact that yit is not necessarilly positive is irrelevant for the utility function considered in this
section.
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with households occurs at actuarially fair prices, that is
q2 (a2, y1) =
1− π (a2, y1)
1 + r
, and q3 = 1/ (1 + r) . (2.2.1)
where π (a2, y1) is the probability that a household who borrowed −a2 and whose income
was y1 in period 1 declares bankruptcy in period 2. Evidently, π (a2, y1) = 0 if a2 ≥ 0.
Thus, at the end of period 2 a household who has not declared bankruptcy (b = 0)
chooses a03 (a2, y1, y2) to solve
V 0 (a2, y1, y2) = max
a3
u
(
y2 + a2 −
a3
1 + r
)
+ βE [u (y3 + a3) |y1, y2] , (2.2.2)
whereas a household who has declared bankruptcy (b = 1) chooses a13 (y1, y2) to solve
V 1 (y1, y2) = max
a3≥0
u
(
y2 −
a3
1 + r
)
+ βE [u (y3 + a3) |y1, y2] . (2.2.3)
At the beginning of period 2 the household chooses b (a2, y1, y2) to solve
V (a2, y1, y2) = max
b∈{0,1}
(1− b)V 0 (a2, y1, y2) + bV
1 (y1, y2) . (2.2.4)
Finally, in period 1 the household chooses a2 (y1) to solve
max
a2
u (y1 − q2 (a2, y1) a2) + βE [V (a2, y1, y2) |y1] .
Definition 6 An equilibrium is policy functions a2 (y1), b (a2, y1, y2), a
0
3 (a2, y1, y2),
and a13 (y1, y2), and prices q2 (a2, y1) and q3, such that: (i) the policy functions solve
the household’s problem, and (ii) q2 (a2, y1) and q3 are given by equation (2.2.1) with
π (a2, y1) = E [b (a2, y1, y2) |y1].
I am interested in the correlation between income shocks and credit limits in period
1, that is, the effect that a change in y1 has on how much the household is able to
borrow. Accordingly, I must define precisely what credit limits are in this environment.
If the household promises to pay −a2 in period 2, it receives −q2 (a2, y1) a2 in period 1.
Hence, the natural definition for credit limits is the following.
51
Definition 7 The credit limit ω (y1), faced by a household with income y1 in period 1,
is given by
ω (y1) ≡ max
a2
(−q2 (a2, y1) a2) .
Households pay back their loans only if the punishment for declaring bankruptcy,
namely the loss of the ability to borrow in period 2, outweighs the cost of making the
payment. In particular, if the household in period 1 is certain that it will want to
save in period 2, it wold default on any outstanding debt in period 2, and, for that
reason, would not be able to borrow at all in period 1. The stronger the expected desire
to borrow in period 2, the more relevant the punishment becomes and the more the
household is able to borrow in period 1.
2.2.2 Negative Correlation without Profile Heterogeneity
If the households face only a persistent income shock (i.e. σ2θ = 0), then, credit limits
are decreasing with income. In order to see this, first notice that the conditional expec-
tations become E
[
yi2 | y
i
1
]
= ρyi1 and E
[
yi3 | y
i
1
]
= ρ2yi1. Consider two households, L
and H, who receive yH1 > y
L
1 in period 1. It follows that
E
[
yH3 − y
H
2 | y
H
1
]
= ρ (ρ− 1) yH1 < ρ (ρ− 1) y
L
1 = E
[
yL3 − y
L
2 | y
L
1
]
,
so that, given the information that the households have in period 1, householdH expects
its income to increase less (or fall more) between periods 2 and 3, than household L.
Therefore, household H is likely to want to borrow less (or save more) than household
L. It follows that, in expectation, the punishment is less relevant for household H, and
it faces a lower credit limit in period 1 as a result, that is ω
(
yH1
)
< ω
(
yL1
)
. In fact, the
following proposition can be established.
Proposition 7 If σθ = 0, then credit limits are decreasing with income, i.e. ω
′ (y1) ≤ 0
for all y1.
The proof for this and the following propositions can be found in Appendix ??.5
5Notice that the CARA assumption is partially responsible for this result. These preferences allow
me to abstract from involuntary bankruptcy (when the available income is so low that the agent is not
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2.2.3 Positive Correlation with Profile Heterogeneity
Introducing profile heterogeneity allows the model to predict the positive correlation
between income levels and credit limits observed in the data without introducing any
additional punishments for declaring bankruptcy. When σθ > 0, a high income level
could be due to a persistent shock, zit , or to high level of the trend component of income,
θi. Whereas when σθ = 0 a higher income level necessarily leads to a lower incentive
to borrow, when σθ > 0 this is not the case. Observing a higher income level is, in this
case, indicative of a higher θi which could (depending on the level of σθ relative to ση)
lead to the expectation that income levels will continue to increase and, therefore, to
a stronger incentive to borrow next period. It, then, follows that a higher y1 implies,
in expectation, a higher relevance for the punishment for declaring bankruptcy, and
households who observe a higher y1 should face higher credit limits. The following
proposition corroborates this logic.
Proposition 8 Credit limits are increasing with income, i.e. ω′ (y1) ≥ 0 for all y1, if
and only if σθ > ρ (1− ρ)ση.
Abstracting from the correlation between income and credit limits, this result shows
that the introduction of profile heterogeneity can have dramatic effects on the incentives
to declare bankruptcy. The quantitative importance of this effect is the subject of the
main experiment in this paper.
2.2.4 Positive Correlation with Additional Punishment
If when declaring bankruptcy the household, in addition to losing the ability to borrow,
also loses a proportion γ of their income, then it is possible to obtain a positive corre-
lation even if σθ = 0. The only necessary change to the setup above is to redefine the
able to make payments which is never the case here). If the utility function displays CRRA instead, it
can be shown that the lower a households income is, the higher the probability of involuntary bankruptcy
which leads credit limits to be increasing with income for very low levels, and only after a certain point
do they become increasing.
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value function under bankruptcy, that is to substitute equation (2.2.3) by
V˜ 1 (y1, y2) = max
a3≥0
u
(
(1− γ) y2 −
a3
1 + r
)
+ βE [u ((1− γ) y3 + a3) |y1, y2]
where I have assumed that the proportion of income is extracted in periods 2 and 3,
though this is not necessary for the result in the following proposition.
Proposition 9 If σθ = 0, credit limits are increasing with income, i.e. ω
′ (y1) ≥ 0 for
all y1, if and only if γ ≥ (1− ρ) / (1 + β).
The intuition for this result is simple. If the households lose a proportion of their
income when declaring bankruptcy, the households with higher income levels lose more
in absolute terms. As a result, the higher a household’s income level is, the more it has
to pay to declare bankruptcy, and higher credit limits follow.
It is not easy to quantify directly the parameter γ. It is supposed to capture the
extra costs to a household that declares bankruptcy, aside from the loss of the ability to
borrow6. What makes it difficult to measure γ is the fact that these costs are arguably
subjective, tantamount to ”stigma”. One way to measure γ would be to ask individuals
who have declared bankruptcy how much they would be willing to pay in order for their
bankruptcy record to become observable only to creditors. However, to my knowledge
such a survey has not been conducted, so that we must identify γ indirectly. In the less
stylized version of the model that follows, I perform comparative statics experiments
with γ in order to obtain a better understanding of its effects.
A similar assumption, also commonly used in the literature (Zame (1993), Athreya
(2008), Athreya et al. (2012)), is to impose a fixed utility cost to declaring bankruptcy.
This assumption has similar implications, since households with higher income levels
have lower marginal utility levels and, therefore, a constant utility cost implies a higher
income cost to households with higher income levels.
6It is important to note that this is not a feature of the bankruptcy law. In fact, an agent is allowed
to borrow after declaring bankruptcy and there are banks that specialize in providing this type of credit.
However, (Chapter 7) bankruptcy stays on ones record for 10 years and this has a significant impact on
an individual’s credit rating and on her ability to borrow.
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2.2.5 Positive Correlation with Restrictions on Ability to Declare
Bankruptcy
This is perhaps the most straight-forward way to obtain a positive correlation between
income levels and credit limits. If households cannot declare bankruptcy if their income
levels are above a certain threshold, for instance, it is quite evident that higher income
levels lead to lower probabilities of bankruptcy and, therefore, to higher credit limits.
Moreover, the inability to declare bankruptcy of some individuals is a salient feature
of the bankruptcy law. Consider, for instance, an individual who had a significant
amount of unsecured debt and suddenly gets a big promotion. This individual is likely
to never again need to borrow, in which case it would benefit from declaring bankruptcy.
The reason this situation is not observed in the data is because such an individual would
not be allowed to declare bankruptcy.7 A judge ultimately decides whether or not to
grant bankruptcy to an individual. This decision is subjective, however it has important
implications to limits on unsecured credit and should not be ignored.
In order to incorporate this characteristic of the bankruptcy system into the model
at hand, I assume that households can only declare bankruptcy when paying back their
current debts leaves them with a utility level below an exogenously set threshold. This
amounts to replacing equation (2.2.4) with
V˜ (a2, y1, y2) =
{
V 0 (a2, y1, y2) , if V
0 (a2, y1, y2) ≥ V
max
{
V 0 (a2, y1, y2) , V
1 (y1, y2)
}
, if V 0 (a2, y1, y2) < V
where V is a cutoff utility level. If by paying back its debt a household is able to obtain
a utility above V , i.e. if V 0 (a2, y1, y2) ≥ V , then it is not allowed to declare bankruptcy.
Otherwise, bankruptcy is allowed.
For any relevant choice of V , however, this setup implies that V˜ (a2, y1, y2) is not
monotonic or continuous in a2. If V
1 (y1, y2) ≤ V for all (y1, y2), then, the introduc-
tion of this threshold is innocuous, since the households would only wish to declare
bankruptcy in the region that they are, in fact, allowed to, that is V 0 (a2, y1, y2) <
7See Gordon (2014) for a normative investigation of who should be allowed to declare bankruptcy.
55
V 1 (y1, y2) implies V
0 (a2, y1, y2) < V . Hence, if this addition to the model is to
have any effect it must be that V 1 (y1, y2) > V for some (y1, y2). Thus, consider a
triple (aˆ2, yˆ1, yˆ2) such that V
1 (yˆ1, yˆ2) > V and V
0 (aˆ2, yˆ1, yˆ2) = V . It follows that,
lima2→aˆ−2
V˜ (a2, yˆ1, yˆ2) = V
1 (yˆ1, yˆ2) > V = V
0 (aˆ2, yˆ1, yˆ2) = lima2→aˆ+2
V˜ (a2, yˆ1, yˆ2); in
some states the households would be better off if they had more debt so as to be able
to declare bankruptcy. Hence, the policy function a2 (y1) would not be a continuous
function of y1. If the household expects V
0 (a2, y1, y2) to be close enough to V , it would
be better off by borrowing up to its credit limit in order to increase its chances of being
able to declare bankruptcy in the following period.
To do away with this type of behavior, in what follows I assume instead that
V˜ (a2, y1, y2) =
{
V 0 (a2, y1, y2) , if V
0 (a2, y1, y2) ≥ V
max
{
V 0 (a2, y1, y2) ,min
{
V 1 (y1, y2) , V
}}
, if V 0 (a2, y1, y2) < V
which implies that if the household is able to attain a utility level above V by declaring
bankruptcy, that is if V 1 (yˆ1, yˆ2) > V , then its debt is only partially discharged, up
to the point in which the household is indifferent between declaring bankruptcy and
receiving V .
2.3 Model
This section contains the description of the quantitative model used in the empirical
analysis. Relative to the simpler model introduced in the previous section, the most
significant changes are that utility is now assumed to be CRRA, the income process Log-
Normal, and there are more periods including some in which the household is assumed to
be retired. The economy consists of a continuum of T =W +R overlapping generations
of households, where T denotes the maximum life-span of a household, withW denoting
the number of working-age years and R the number of retirement years. There are also a
continuum of perfectly competitive financial intermediaries with which the agents trade
discount bonds.
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2.3.1 Preferences
Households only value consumption and are assumed to supply labor inelastically. dur-
ing their working-age years. Preferences are represented by a time-separable utility
function over sequences of consumption with CRRA period utility, u (c) = c1−σ/ (1− σ).
Households have a common discount factor denoted by β and face an age dependent
probability of death. Let pt denote the probability of death between the ages t and
t+ 1 and define δt ≡ β (1− pt). The problem of a household is to choose, over time, a
feasible sequence of consumption levels {ct}
T
t=1 to maximize their expected utility.
2.3.2 Income
Working Age
Here I set up an income process that encompasses the possibility of a standard common
income profile and that of households having potentially different profiles. An individual
of working-age faces an exogenous stochastic income process with
yit = y + exp
(
gt + θ
it+ zit + ε
i
t
)
, (2.3.1)
where y is a lower bound to yit; gt is a common life cycle component supposed to capture
differences in the mean income for different ages; θi ∼ N
(
0, σ2θ
)
captures differences
between individual income profile growth rates; zit is a persistent shock with
zit = ρz
i
t−1 + ηt, (2.3.2)
ηit ∼ N
(
0, σ2η
)
, and zi0 ∼ N
(
0, σ2z0
)
; and εit ∼ N
(
0, σ2ε
)
is a transitory shock. More
precisely, let θi be a result of two independent random draws, θi = θik + θ
i
u, with
θik ∼ N
(
0, σ2θk
)
and θiu ∼ N
(
0, σ2θu
)
. The first part, θik, is observed (known) by the
household, and the second, θiu, is not (unknown). It follows that σ
2
θ = σ
2
θk
+ σ2θu .
The proportion of the variance that is unknown, σ2θu/σ
2
θ , is an important determinant
of the uncertainty associated with the income process. The data counterpart of yit is
supposed to be after-taxes/transfers earnings controlled for household characteristics
not contained in the model.
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Retirement
In reality, retirement benefits (US Social Security Administration’s Old-Age Insurance
Benefit System) are a function of the individual average life cycle income, y¯i. Introducing
this feature in the model is not computationally practical as it implies another state
variable. With this in mind I follow Guvenen and Smith (2014) and instead calculate
retirement income in two parts. First I estimate a function y¯i = α0 + α1y
i
W ≡ yˆ
i,
using data simulated using equation (2.3.1). Then, denoting the cross-sectional average
working-age income by y¯, I calculate the retirement benefit, yR, with the actual formula
used by the US Social Security Administration,
yR
(
yˆi
)
=


0.9yˆi , if yˆi ≤ 0.3y¯
0.27y¯ + 0.32
(
yˆi − 0.3y¯
)
, if 0.3y¯ < yˆi ≤ 2y¯
0.814y¯ + 0.15
(
yˆi − 2y¯
)
, if 2y¯ < yˆi ≤ 4.1y¯
1.129y¯ , if yˆi > 4.1y¯,
(2.3.3)
where the estimated average income, yˆi, acts as a substitute for the actual individual
average y¯i.
2.3.3 Bayesian Learning
If the households observed their output levels, yit, and the stochastic component z
i
t+ ε
i
t,
then they would immediately, in period 1, learn their income profile growth rate, θi.
In what follows, though, I assume that households observe only yit and, based on these
observations, form beliefs about its stochastic components. Households, then, learn
about θi over time according to a Bayesian rule. In order to compute a household’s
Bayesian estimates at each period it is convenient to write the learning process as a
Kalman filtering problem with state and observation equations given respectively by
[
θi
zit
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sit
=
[
1 0
0 ρ
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
F
[
θi
zit−1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sit−1
+
[
0
ηit
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
νit
, and y˜it =
[
t 1
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
H′t
[
θi
zit
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Sit
+ εit,
where St is a vector of hidden state variables and y˜
i
t ≡ ln
(
yit − y
)
− gt.
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The system is assumed to start in period time t = 0 at which time the state vector
Si1 is regarded as a random variable. Let
(
Sˆi1|0, P
i
1|0
)
be the Bayesian prior on Si1, that
is Sˆi1|0 ≡ E
i
0
[
Si1
]
and P i1|0 ≡ E
i
0
[(
Si1 − Sˆ
i
1
)(
Si1 − Sˆ
i
1
)′]
. Also, define Sˆi
t|s ≡ E
i
s
[
Sit
]
and P i
t|s ≡ E
i
s
[(
Sit − Sˆt|s
)(
Sit − Sˆ
i
t|s
)′]
, where Eis [·] ≡ E
[
·|y˜is, ..., y˜
i
1, Sˆ
i
1|0
]
. Finally, let
Q denote the covariance matrix of νit .
It follows that, given the Bayesian prior on Si1, we can calculate the evolution of
mean beliefs using the following recursive formulas. The covariance matrices follow
Pt|t = Pt|t−1 − Pt|t−1Ht
(
H ′tPt|t−1Ht + σ
2
ε
)−1
H ′tPt|t−1, and Pt+1|t = FPt|tF
′ +Q.
(2.3.4)
Notice that P i
t|t and P
i
t|t−1 are independent of the observations of y˜
i
t (which is why I
removed the corresponding superscripts in these last equations). The one period ahead
estimates about the hidden state variables can be computed using
Sˆit|t = Sˆ
i
t|t−1 + Pt|t−1Ht
(
H ′tPt|t−1Ht + σ
2
ε
)−1 (
y˜it −H
′
tSˆ
i
t|t−1
)
, and Sˆit+1|t = FSˆ
i
t|t.
(2.3.5)
Then, it follows that
y˜it+1|Sˆ
i
t|t ∼ N
(
H ′t+1FSˆ
i
t|t,H
′
t+1Pt+1|tHt+1 + σ
2
ε
)
.
Hence, in order built an estimate of next period’s income it sufficient to keep track of
two state variables, Sˆi
t|t =
(
θˆit, zˆ
i
t
)
= Eit
[(
θi, zit
)]
; that is, the estimates for
(
θi, zit
)
given
the information the household has in the current period, t.
Notice that even if σ2θ = 0 (so that θ
i ≡ 0), observing y˜it does not reveal the
stochastic components zit and ε
i
t. Thus, there exists a version of the model, not pursued
in this paper, in which there is no profile heterogeneity but households still use Bayesian
learning to identify over time the stochastic components of their income. In order to stay
in contact with what has been done in the literature, in what follows I study a version of
the model with learning and heterogeneous income profiles (HIP) and a version without
learning or profile heterogeneity (RIP - for restricted income profiles). In the RIP model
I assume that the households observe zit and ε
i
t, thus, in order to estimate next period’s
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income, it is sufficient to have only one state variable, zit. From now on I will denote the
state variable necessary for the one period ahead estimation of the next period income
level by st, with st =
(
θˆit, zˆ
i
t
)
for the HIP model and st = zt for the RIP model.
2.3.4 Market Arrangements
In each period t, a household can borrow or save by purchasing a single one-period dis-
count bond with face value at+1. A debt contract, such that at+1 < 0, implies that the
household receives −qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1 units of consumption in period t in exchange for
the promise to pay −at+1 units in period t+1, unless it declares bankruptcy. If at+1 > 0,
on the other hand, the contract implies a payment of qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1 in period t in
exchange for a promise to receive at+1 in period t+ 1. These contracts are signed be-
tween households and financial intermediaries who are allowed to price them differently
depending on the size of the contract, at+1, and the households state variable st. Allow-
ing, this price differentiation is necessary to avoid cross subsidization (see Chatterjee
et al. (2007)) between households facing different risks of declaring bankruptcy in period
t+ 1. Further, behind the dependency of qt+1 on st is the assumption that there is no
information asymmetry between households and intermediaries8.
2.3.5 Household’s Decision
During their working life, that is for t < W , households decide whether to declare
bankruptcy or not after observing the current period’s income level. Let xt denote
the cash-in-hand that a household starts the period with. If it chooses not to declare
bankruptcy, then the household solves
V 0t (xt, st) = max
at+1


u (xt − qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1)+
δtEt

max


V 0t+1 (at+1 + χt+1 + yt+1, st+1) ,
min
{
V 1t+1 (Γ (yt+1) , st+1) , V t+1
}






, (2.3.6)
8Chatterjee et al. (2008) study unsecured debt in an environment with private information.
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where χt+1 ≤ 0 denotes a potential expense shock that the household might incur in
the next period and the function Γ (·) specifies the income of an agent who has declared
bankruptcy,
Γ (y) = (1− γ) y − γ0. (2.3.7)
This function allows for a proportional and an absolute cost to income. The threshold
value V t, analogous to the one introduced in Section 2.2.5, is defined as the value of of
receiving a constant income equal to a proportion κ of average income for the rest of
ones life, while being able to borrow or save at prices given by equation (2.3.13) bellow9.
Further, it takes as given the price schedule qt+1 (at+1, st) and the evolution of st, which
follows equations (2.3.4) and (2.3.5) for the HIP model and (2.3.2) for the RIP model.
If, instead the household chooses to declare bankruptcy it will solve
V 1t (xt, st) = max
at+1≥0


u (xt − qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1)+
δtEt


(1− λ)max


V 1t+1 (at+1 + χt+1 + Γ (yt+1) , st+1) ,
min
{
V 1t+1 (Γ (yt+1) , st+1) , V t+1
}


+λmax


V 0t+1 (at+1 + χt+1 + yt+1, st+1) ,
min
{
V 1t+1 (Γ (yt+1) , st+1) , V t+1
}






.
(2.3.8)
When the household declares bankruptcy, it stays on its record for a random amount
of periods during which it is not allowed to sign debt contracts, thus the constraint
at+1 ≥ 0. The parameter λ is the probability that a household has this record re-
moved in the next period. Even though these households cannot accumulate debt, they
still might need to declare bankruptcy if they receive an expense shock. The corre-
sponding household’s savings/borrowing policy functions are given by a0t+1 (xt, st) and
a1t+1 (xt, st). Moreover, let bt (at + χt, yt, st) be the bankruptcy decision policy function
9I impose only a natural borrowing limit in the calculation of V t. This is a simplifying assumption
that does not have an important assumption since β (1 + r) is close to 1 in the calibrations bellow.
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associated with the second maximization in equation (2.3.6), that is
bt (at + χt, yt, st) =


0 , if V 0t (at + χt + yt, st) ≥ min
{
V 1t (Γ (yt) , st) , V t
}
1 , if V 0t (at + χt + yt, st) < min
{
V 1t (Γ (yt) , st) , V t
}
One could also define policy functions for the bankruptcy decisions in equation (2.3.8),
however, these will not be necessary for defining the equilibrium of this economy. The
reason being that any debt that the agent chooses not to pay as a result of declaring
bankruptcy while excluded from credit markets must be due expense shocks. These
expense shocks, however, are assumed to be a wasteful cost paid to no one inside the
model10.
The focus of this paper is on the income risk that household’s face and its effect
on bankruptcy decisions and credit limits. Since during retirement the households no
longer face any income risk this period is only of interest to the extent that it affects
households’ behavior during their working life. With this in mind, I make the following
simplifying assumptions. During retirement, for t > W households are not allowed to
borrow and cease to face expense shocks. Their decisions can be summarized by
V R0t (xt) = max
at+1≥0
{
u
(
xt −
(
1− pt
1 + r
)
at+1
)
+ δtV
R0
t+1 (at+1 + yR)
}
(2.3.9)
if they enter the retirement period without a record of bankruptcy and
V R1t (xt) =


maxat+1≥0
{
u
(
xt −
(
1−pt
1+r
)
at+1
)
+ δtV
R1
t+1 (at+1 + Γ (yR))
}
, if t < W + τ
maxat+1≥0
{
u
(
xt −
(
1−pt
1+r
)
at+1
)
+ δtV
R0
t+1 (at+1 + yR)
}
, if t ≥W + τ
(2.3.10)
otherwise. This means that, if a household enters retirement with bankruptcy on its
record, its income will be reduced according to equation (2.3.7) for a fixed number
of years, τ . Let aR0t+1 (xt) and a
R1
t+1 (xt) denote the policy functions associated the the
savings decision during retirement.
10For a general equilibrium treatment of these costs see Chatterjee et al. (2007).
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Finally, in the last period of working life, for t =W , agents solve
V 0t (xt, st) = max
at+1
{
u
(
xt −
(
1− pt
1 + r
)
at+1
)
+ δtV
R0
t+1 (at+1 + yR (yt))
}
(2.3.11)
and
V 1t (xt, st) = max
at+1≥0
{
u
(
xt −
(
1− pt
1 + r
)
at+1
)
+ δtV
R1
t+1 (at+1 + Γ (yR (yt)))
}
(2.3.12)
where yR (·) is given by equation (2.3.3).
2.3.6 Financial Intermediaries
Every financial intermediary has the unlimited ability to borrow or save at a fixed
interest rate r. Perfect competition between them implies that they charge actuarially
fair prices which amounts to
qt+1 (at+1, st) =
1− pt
1 + r
, if at+1 ≥ 0; (2.3.13)
qt+1 (at+1, st) =
1− pt
1 + r
Et [1− bt+1 (at+1 + χt+1, yt+1, st+1)] , if at+1 < 0, (2.3.14)
where the numerator is the probability that a household survives until the next period
and decides not to default given the face value of the contract, at+1, and the household’s
income state, st.
2.3.7 Equilibrium
Definition 8 A recursive (partial) competitive equilibrium consists of value functions
V 0t and V
1
t for all t ≤ W , and V
R0
t and V
R1
t for all t > W ; policy functions a
0
t+1, a
1
t+1
and bt for all t ≤W , and a
R0
t+1 and a
R1
t+1 for all t > W ; and a pricing functions qt+1 for
all t < W such that
1. the value functions V 0t and V
1
t satisfy the functional equations (2.3.6), (2.3.8),
(2.3.11), and (2.3.12), and the policy functions a0t+1, a
1
t+1 and bt are the solutions
to the corresponding problems;
63
2. the value functions V R0t and V
R1
t satisfy the functional equations (2.3.9), and
(2.3.10), and the policy functions aR0t+1 and a
R1
t+1 are the solutions to the corre-
sponding problems;
3. the pricing functions qt+1 are given by equations (2.3.13) and (2.3.14).
2.3.8 Credit Limits
The definition of credit limits is analogous to Definition 7 in Section 2.2. In period t, if
the household promises to pay −at+1 in period t+ 1, it receives −qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1 in
period t. The credit limit is defined as the most that a household is allowed to borrow,
that is:
Definition 9 The credit limit ωt (st), faced by a household with income state st in
period t, is given by
ωt (st) ≡ max
at+1
(−qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1) .
2.4 Parametrization
The model period is one calendar year. Working life begins at age 25, and ends at age
65 (W = 41), and the retirement duration is 30 years (R = 30). Relative risk aversion
is set to σ = 2 and the risk-free interest rate to r = 1/0.96−1. The lower bound income
level, y, is set to 5% of average working-age income.
The probability of a household having bankruptcy removed from its record is set to
λ = 0.1 so that the average number of years a record is kept is 10 years. This is in line
with the time period that the Fair Credit Reporting Act allows it to be maintained on an
individual’s record (see Figure B.1). For the same reason, τ , the number of retirement
years that bankruptcy stays on a household’s record when it enters retirement having
such a record is set to 5 years.
For the common life cycle profile of log income, gt, I feed into the model the empirical
profile computed from the PSID. The age-dependent death probabilities pt are taken
from the National Vital Statistics Reports (Vol. 54, No. 14, April 19, 2006). For every
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calibration that follows, I choose the household’s discount factor, β, to match an average
wealth-to-output ratio of 4.9 (the value in the SCF sample).
Expense shocks are supposed to capture unexpected out-of-pocket medical bills,
divorces, and unplanned pregnancies which are frequently cited as reasons for declaring
bankruptcy. Livshits et al. (2007) used data from Medical Expenditure Panel Survey,
the US Health Care Financing Administration, the American Hospital Association and
the US Census Bureau to obtain reasonable estimates for these shocks. Following their
procedure I allow χt to take three values summarized in Table 2.1.
Table 2.1: Expense Shocks Parameters
No Shock Low Shock High Shock
% of Average Income 0.0 26.4 82.2
Probability 97.4 2.45 0.15
Notes: Livshits et al. (2007) report probabilities of the event occurring once in a
three-year period, here the probabilities have been adjusted to be that of the event
occurring in a year.
For the RIP and HIP income process parameters (summarized in Table 2.2) I use
estimates from Guvenen (2009) and Guvenen and Smith (2014) respectively. The es-
timation of the RIP process is relatively standard in the literature. Identifying the
parameters for the HIP process is significantly more involved. By merging consumption
data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey and income data from the PSID, and using
indirect inference, Guvenen and Smith (2014) obtain reliable estimates11.
An important aspect of the calibration of the HIP income process is the determina-
tion of the prior about unobservables. The prior about z1 is that it has mean 0 and vari-
ance σ2η , which follows from the assumption that z0 is unobserved. For the prior about
11Guvenen and Smith (2014) allow for another dimension of profile heterogeneity which I have not
included in equation (2.3.1), namely households can have different income profile intercepts besides
having different profile growth rates. Including this, however, would lead to one more state variable and
add a significant computational burden. Instead, I use their estimate for the intercept variance as the
variance of z0 (which they assume to be 0).
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θi, I again make use of Guvenen and Smith (2014) who estimate that the prior variance
of θi is only about 35.5 percent the population variance (that is , σ2θu/σ
2
θ = 0.355);
households know relatively well what is the growth rate of their income when they enter
the labor market (or by the time they reach the age of 25).
Table 2.2: Income Process Parameters
Model ρ ση σε σz0 σθ
RIP 0.988 0.122 0.247 0.241 -
HIP 0.768 0.196 0.008 0.265 0.0166
In some versions of the model analyzed below the credit limits that some agents face
are unusually high. For instance, if κ is relatively low, an agent with a high income level
will face virtually zero probability of default until the natural borrowing limit is reached.
Thus the lower bound of the asset space, denoted by a, must be chosen carefully. This
parameter and the remaining parameters associated with the bankruptcy rules and
punishments are the subject of the experiments in the next section.
2.5 Comparative Statics
Let φ denote the percentage increase in credit limits that results from a 1% in income
(controlling for other individual characteristics). In the data φ is approximately 0.65
(see Section 2.6.1). However, if the only punishment for declaring bankruptcy is the
loss of the ability to borrow and if anyone can declare bankruptcy, the model predicts
φ close to 0. This is due to the following logic. Abstract from retirement or death
probabilities, and consider an individual in the last period of its life, T . This individual
would obviously not be able to borrow in period T , since she will not be alive to pay
back any debt. Hence, in period T − 1, the punishment of not being able to borrow is
irrelevant since this will happen in any case. It follows that this individual will not be
able to borrow in period T − 1 either. By backwards induction it follows that credit
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limits will be 0 in every period12. Having a retirement period, death probabilities and
an absolute punishment such as γ0 do not mitigate this effect in a significant way.
So, in this section I study the quantitative effect of the two alternative solutions
to this problem presented in Section 2.2, namely the addition of a proportional income
punishment, γ, and a limit to the ability to declare bankruptcy of agents with high levels
of income, controlled by the parameter κ. In both experiments I report the results for
the RIP and HIP income processes.
For these comparative static experiments, I need to set benchmark parameter values
for a and γ0. In the data the only 0.4% have credit limits above 2 times the average
income level. Thus, I set a, so that −a/ (1 + r) is equal to 2 times the average income
in the model. The whole Chapter 7 bankruptcy process costs about 300 dollars in
filing fees and an additional 1, 500 dollars in legal fees. I choose the absolute cost, γ0,
accordingly.
2.5.1 Proportional Income Punishment (changes in γ)
In this section I set κ → ∞, so that anyone can declare bankruptcy and focus for the
effect of changes in γ. Figure 2.1 shows the effect of changes in the proportional income
punishment, γ, on the relationship between income and credit limits summarize by φ.
The HIP model generates higher φ’s than the RIP model for every level of γ which is
consistent with the intuition from Section 2.2.3. Accordingly, the level of γ necessary
for the model to generate the φ close to the data (φdata ≈ 0.65) is significantly lower in
the HIP model (γHIP∗ ≈ 0.014) than in the RIP (γRIP∗ ≈ 0.026). .
12See Bulow and Rogoff (1989) for a version of this argument for an infinitely lived agent.
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2.5.2 Restrictions on Ability to Declare Bankruptcy (changes in κ)
In this section γ is set to 0, and I focus on changes in κ. It is interesting to observe that
the both curves have a positive slope in Figure 2.2. This is due to the lower bound on
assets, a. For low values of κ, most households face a borrowing limit in (or close to)
the upper bound of −a/ (1 + r) and only for households with particularly low income
levels do credit limits increase with income. For higher levels of κ the subset of income
levels for which credit limits are below this upper bound increases and as a result the
overall correlation between income and credit limits increases.
Figure 2.2
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Similarly to the result in Figure 2.1 and for the same reason, the HIP model generates
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a higher φ than the RIP model for any given level of κ. However, since the slope of the
curve in now positive, this leads to κHIP∗ ≈ 0.24 < 0.30 ≈ κRIP∗.
2.6 Model versus Data
In this section I document key facts related to credit limits and bankruptcy filings and
use them to calibrate the RIP and HIP versions of the model. Most of the data used
in this section comes from merging the Survey of Consumer Finances (SCF) datasets
from 2001 to 2010. The income processes estimated by Guvenen (2009) and Guvenen
and Smith (2014) use a subset of the PSID data. In order for the SCF sample to be
consistent with the one used to estimate the income processes I clean the data following
the procedure described in Guvenen and Smith (2014)13.
2.6.1 Credit Limits and Income
To measure (unsecured) credit limits I use credit card limits reported by the SCF14.
This measure does not include some categories of unsecured debt such as unsecured
personal loans. For that reason I do not use the absolute values of these limits for the
analysis only its relationship with income. The underlying assumption is, therefore,
that these other types of unsecured debt correlate with income in a similar way.
It is important to note that the type of credit contracts available in the model are
somewhat different from the types observed in the data. In the model a household,
depending on its current income state, sit, faces a schedule of interest rates. This sched-
ule generates a Laffer type curve, at some point promising to pay more in the next
period (i.e. choosing a higher −at+1) lead to lower amount of credit (i.e. a lower
−qt+1 (at+1, st) at+1). Credit limits in the model are defined as the top of this Laffer
13First I drop the households in the top 1% of net worth since the PSID is known for being a good
representation of the bottom 99% (see Juster et al. (1999)). Then, I keep only married, working age,
non-retired, non-disabled, and male-headed observations in order to preserve consistency with Guvenen
and Smith (2014).
14More precisely, a household’s credit limit is their answer to the question ”What is the maximum
amount you could borrow on (this account/ all of these accounts); that is, what is your total credit
limit?” which is asked after inquires about each of the household’s credit cards.
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curve. In the data, on the other hand, credit card contracts usually offer a limit, in-
dependent of the loan size, at a pre-approved interest rate15. The difference, however,
is not irreconcilable. First, the contracts being offered on the wrong side of the Laffer
curve are never chosen in the model and could be ignored, I could have simply assumed
that such contracts are not permitted without any consequences. Moreover, the ”right”
part of the schedule can be understood as the interest rates a household would face if
it chooses to acquire additional credit cards until eventually it is denied16.
The measure of income is after taxes and transfers earnings calculated using the SCF
together with the NBER program TAXSIM. Regressing log-credit limits on log-income,
a cubic in age and other household observables17 leads to the following results (Figure
B.2 shows the corresponding scatter plot).
Table 2.3: Credit Limits vs. Income
Dependent Variable: Log Credit Limit
Log Income 0.736 0.695 0.689
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012)
Cubic in Age No Yes Yes
Other Observ. No No Yes
Adjusted R2 0.149 0.179 0.200
Notes: Standard errors in parenthesis. Based on 29281 observations from the
SCF 2001-2010.
2.6.2 Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act
Before moving on with the comparison between model and data it is important to
notice a significant policy change that happened during the period under analysis. The
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act (BAPCPA) of 2005 made
15For an analysis of credit limits that takes this fact explicitly into consideration see Mateos-Planas
(2013).
16Around 84 percent of the SCF sample has at least one credit card, out of those 74 percent report
have more than one, 40 percent more than two, and 7 percent more than five.
17Namely: family size, race, survey year, and cohort dummies.
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several changes to bankruptcy law18. Most notably it imposed a restriction on the
ability of some agents to declare bankruptcy under Chapter 7. If a household’s monthly
income averaged over the six months prior to filing is less than the median monthly
income level in their state (adjusted for family size) then it can file. Otherwise, the
household must fill out a form detailing its income and necessary expenses (including
debt payments) which are used to calculate its disposable income. If their calculated
disposable income is above 166 dollars a month, the household must file under Chapter
13 (which involves garnishment of future income).
This change in the law had important effects, on impact, in the proportion of
bankruptcies filed under Chapter 7 (see Figure B.3). This proportion which used to
average around 72% filings spiked in the months before the reform was signed into law
to about 86%. Then, it dropped to 58% before virtually recovering to its initial level.
This together with the fact that the distribution of the income of those who file for
bankruptcy did not change in any significant way (see Figure B.4), lead me to conclude
that this change would not affect the numerical experiments I perform in this paper
which assumes a constant bankruptcy system throughout. The fact that the BAPCPA
had relatively minor long run effects could, in fact, be used a supporting evidence of the
modeling of how bankruptcy judges make their decisions. In short what the means test
implies is that one can only file under Chapter 7 if it cannot support a minimal level of
consumption that qualifies as necessary. The fact that the proportions households who
file under Chapter 7 did not change significantly could be explained by the fact that a
version of such a rule was already in place and that households who knew they would
not be granted bankruptcy (and, therefore did not file) are the same who cannot file
after BAPCPA.
2.6.3 Model Performance
In what follows I present results for the calibration of the RIP and HIP versions of the
model models in which the discount factor, β, and the bankruptcy parameters γ0, γ,
κ, and a are calibrated to match φ and other important statistics related to unsecured
credit. Table 2.4 summarizes the results.
18See White (2007) for a detailed discussion.
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Table 2.4: Model Performance
Parameters Targets
RIP HIP Data RIP HIP
β 0.967 0.968 Wealth-to-Inc. 4.90 4.91 4.90
γ0/y 0.005 0.001 φ 0.69 0.69 0.70
γ 0.010 0.029 Debt-to-Inc. 0.22 0.22 0.22
κ 0.452 0.437 Bkr. Filings (%) 0.46 0.39 0.04
−a/(1 + r)y 0.703 0.536 Bkr. from Inc. 0.53 0.59 0.49
Households in Debt
Since there is only one type of asset in the model I use the household’s consolidated asset
position, net-worth, as a measure of their asset level. This implies that only households
with negative net-worth will be considered to be in debt It also implies that a negative
net-worth is associated with unsecured debt. Though not perfect, this assumption is
not as problematic as it might seem at first. Since, for instance, if a household has a
mortgage with a principal above the market value of their house, it is reasonable to
consider the difference to be unsecured debt. A household would lose their house if
it chooses to default on such a loan, the value of the house would be automatically
deducted from what it owes, some of the extra debt might be forgiven but usually most
of it is assumed as unsecured debt (this procedure is known as ”short payoff”). Using
data from the SCF I calculate that about 5.2 percent of households have negative net-
worth and that the average debt-to-income ratio of those households is close to 22.3
percent. Both versions of the model are able to match this target.
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Bankruptcy Filings
Using data from the Administrative Office of the US Courts and of the US Census I
compute the percentage of households who file for bankruptcy each year. Between 2001
and 2010 the average number of bankruptcies filed was 979, 715 while the average pop-
ulation (above age 20) was 212, 435, 033, so about 0.456 percent of households filled for
bankruptcy each year. The RIP model performs relatively well only slightly underes-
timating the number of filings. On the other hand, the HIP model is able to generate
only about 10 percent of the number of bankruptcy filings.
This is an important failure and can be viewed as a problem for the HIP literature.
One of the main findings in this literature is that once profile heterogeneity is allowed
the models are able to generate the variance in income of households with significantly
less risk. A large part of this variance is shown to be due to differences in income profiles
which the households know a lot about. In fact, in this paper I am using the parameters
from the simpler version of the model in Guvenen and Smith (2014). More elaborate
versions that allow for private partial insurance imply even less risk. The problem
highlighted here is that at these levels of risk the model severally underestimates the
number of bankruptcy filings.
Reasons for Declaring Bankruptcy In 1996, the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID), asked its respondents who had filed for bankruptcy if they used Chapter 7 or
13 and what was their main reason for doing so19. Out of those who filed Chapter
7, around 12.2 percent reported the main reason being job loss, 41.3 percent credit
misuse, 14.3 marital disruption, 16.4 percent health-care bills, and 15.9 percent reported
lawsuits/harassment. Following Chatterjee et al. (2007) I associate the first two reasons
(job loss and credit misuse) with shocks in the income process and the following three
(marital disruption, health-care bills, and lawsuits/harassment) with expense shocks. I
assume that a bankruptcy filing in the model is due to an expense shock if the household
receives such a shock concomitantly. The corresponding target is in the last row of Table
2.4. This data is based on only 189 households in the PSID who had filed Chapter 7
bankruptcy, so in the calibration procedure I used a weight for this target that was 1/3
19See Chakravarty and Rhee (1999) for a more detailed analysis of this dataset.
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of the other weights. This lead to results that do not match the target exactly but are
close enough.
Filings over the life cycle Figure 2.3 displays the pattern of bankruptcy filings over
the life-cycle in the data and in the two versions of the model.
Figure 2.3
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The models have similar performances in this untargeted dimension with most
bankruptcy filings occurring between the ages of 25 and 50. The fact that households
start their lives in the model at 25 years of age and with zero net worth reduces the
ability of the model to generate enough fillings between the ages of 25 and 30; at these
ages most households have not accumulated enough debt. Starting the model at an
earlier age could be a way to fix this problem.
2.7 Conclusion
This paper investigates the quantitative relevance of the key determinants of credit
limits. I find that the introduction of profile heterogeneity in the households’ income
processes increases the correlation between income and credit limits in all bankruptcy
systems evaluated. This fact is consistent with the theoretical results established earlier
in the paper (in Section 2.2). Relative to other results in the literature I find that
calibrated proportional income punishments are quantitatively small with or without
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profile heterogeneity (1.4 percent and 2.6 percent respectively). A threshold level of
income, such that agents are only allowed to declare bankruptcy for income levels bellow
that threshold, is shown to be an alternative to such proportional punishments. I
also show that credit limits and income levels are strongly related in the data, a fact
that I argue can be used to further discipline bankruptcy models. Finally, the main
calibration results suggest an important qualification about HIP models: the lower
levels of uncertainty implied by these models lead to a severe underestimation of the
number of bankruptcy filings.
The findings in this paper open new avenues of research that should be explored.
The importance of profile heterogeneity for the results shows that patterns on credit
limits could be useful in obtaining further empirical tests about this assumption and
help refine the identification of the associated income process parameters. It would also
be interesting to study these differences from a normative perspective, it is likely that
the optimal bankruptcy system is significantly different depending on which process is
being analyzed. The parameters that determine the bankruptcy system in the proposed
model (i.e. the proportional income cost and the threshold level of income) are good
candidates for such an experiment. Finally, this paper highlights the importance of the
bankruptcy rules and punishments, it would be interesting if one could obtain more
direct evidence on them.
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Appendix A
Appendix to Chapter 1
This appendix presents concise versions of the proofs. Extensive versions with more
details are contained in a separate online appendix which can be found in our websites.
A.1 Proofs for two-period economies
A.1.1 Uncertainty economy
Define τkR ≡ rτ
k/ (1 + r). Six equations determine a tax distorted equilibrium (K,nL,
nH , r, w; τ
n, τkR, T ) according to Definition 1: the first order conditions of the agent’s
problem (one intertemporal and two intratemporal), the first order conditions of the
firm’s problem
r = fK (K,N) , and w = fN (K,N) , where N = πeLnL + (1− π) eHnH (A.1.1)
and the government’s budget constraint. Using equation (A.1.1) to substitute out for r
and w we are left with a system of four equations that any vector
(
K,nL, nH , τ
n, τkR, T
)
of equilibrium values must satisfy. The two degrees of freedom are a result of the fact
that the planner has three instruments
(
τn, τkR, T
)
that are restricted by one equation,
the government’s budget constraint. Defining welfare by
W ≡ u (ω −K, n¯) + βE
[
u
(
(1− τn) fN (K,N) eini +
(
1− τkR
)
fK (K,N)K + T
)
, ni
]
82
83
and totally differentiating the four equilibrium equations together with this definition
and making the appropriate simplifications using Assumption 1 we obtain the following
equation (the algebra is tedious and, therefore, suppressed1):
dW = Θndτn +ΘkdτkR,
where Θn and Θk are complicated functions of equilibrium variables2.
Lemma 2 Under Assumption 1, in equilibrium nH > nL and uc (cL, nL) > uc (cH , nH).
The proof of this Lemma is contained in the online appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. First notice that the optimal tax system must satisfy Θn = 0
and Θk = 0, otherwise there would exist variations in
(
τn, τkR
)
∈ (−∞, 1)2 that would
increase welfare. Θk = 0 simplifies to θk1 + θ
k
2τ
n + θk3τ
k
R = 0 where
θk1 ≡ fNfKNN (Vc − Uc) , θ
k
2 ≡ fNfKNN ((1 + κ)Uc − Vc) ,
and θk3 ≡ fK (fN + fKNKκ)Uc.
Solving this equation for τkR, substituting it in Θ
n = 0 and simplifying entails
Vc (1− τ
n)− Uc (1− (1 + κ) τ
n) = 0.
1Mathematica codes that compute all the algebraic steps are available upon request.
2Here are the exact formulas:
Θk ≡
fKKUc
Φ
{
fNfKNN [(1− τ
n) (Vc − Uc) + τ
nκUc] + τ
k
RfK (fN + fKNKκ)Uc
}
.
Θn ≡
fNN
(1− τn)Φ
{
(
1− τkR
)
f2KfNK
[
(1− τn)
(
Ucc (Uc − Vc) + τ
k
R (Vcc − Ucc)Uc
)
−
(
1− τkR
)
τnκUccUc
]
+ fN [(1− τ
n) (Vc − Uc) + τ
nκUc]
[(
1− τkR
)
fKNNUc −Ku
0
cc
]
+
(
1− τkR
)
τkRfKNfKKκU
2
c }.
where
Uc ≡ β [piuc (cL, nL) + (1− pi)uc (cH , nH)] , Ucc ≡ β [piucc (cL, nL) + (1− pi)ucc (cH , nH)] ,
Vc ≡ β
[
piuc (cL, nL)
eLnL
N
+ (1− pi)uc (cH , nH)
eHnH
N
]
,
Vcc ≡ β
[
piucc (cL, nL)
eLnL
N
+ (1− pi)ucc (cH , nH)
eHnH
N
]
,
Φ ≡
(
1− τkR
) (
fKfNfKNKN ((1− τ
n) (Vcc − Ucc) + τ
nκUcc) + (fN + fKNKκ) f
2
KKUcc − fNfKNNUc
)
+ (fN + fKNKκ)Ku
0
cc.
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Solving for τn we obtain equation (1.2.1) and substituting it back in the equation for
τkR we obtain τ
k
R = 0; and, therefore, τ
k = 0. This is the only pair
(
τn, τkR
)
∈ (−∞, 1)2
that solves the system Θn = 0 and Θk = 0. The fact that the optimal level of τn > 0
follows from Lemma 2.
A.1.2 Inequality economy
The proof of Proposition 2 is entirely analogous and for that reason suppressed here. It
can be found in the online appendix.
A.2 Proofs for complete market economies
The proofs follow straight-forwardly the approach introduced byWerning (2007). Hence,
for details on the logic behind the procedure we refer the reader to that paper, here
we focus mainly on the parts that comprise our value added. We depart from Werning
(2007) in following ways: we use the GHH utility function (whereas he studies the sep-
arable and Cobb-Douglas cases), we do not allow the Ramsey planner to choose time
zero policies and impose an upper bound of 1 for capital income taxes. These depar-
tures make the Ramsey planner’s problem comparable to our benchmark experiment.
The restriction on time zero policies is particularly important because it prevents the
planner from confiscating the (potentially unequal) initial capital levels eliminating the
corresponding redistribution motives.
Consider Economy 4 as described in Section 1.6. For simplicity, we assume that
agents are divided into a finite number of types i ∈ I of relative size πi. Type i has
an initial asset position of ai,0 and a productivity level of ei. Let pt denote the price of
the consumption good in period t in terms of period 0. Since markets are complete we
can write down the present value budget constraint of the agent (remember that τ c is
a parameter),
∞∑
t=0
pt ((1 + τ
c) ci,t + ai,t+1) ≤
∞∑
t=0
pt ((1− τ
n
t )wteini,t +Rtai,t + Tt) ,
where Rt ≡ 1 +
(
1− τkt
)
rt. Rule out arbitrage opportunities by setting pt = Rt+1pt+1,
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and define T ≡
∑∞
t=0 ptTt. Then, the budget constraint simplifies to
∞∑
t=0
pt ((1 + τ
c) ci,t − (1− τ
n
t )wteini,t) ≤ R0ai,0 + T . (A.2.1)
Similarly, the government’s budget constraint simplifies to
R0B0 + T +
∑
t
ptG =
∑
t
pt
(
τ cCt + τ
n
t wtNt + τ
k
t rtKt
)
. (A.2.2)
The resource constraint is given by
Ct +G+Kt+1 = f (Kt, Nt) , for all t ≥ 0. (A.2.3)
Definition 10 Given {ai,0}, K0, B0 and
(
τn0 , τ
k
0 , T0
)
, a competitive equilibrium is a pol-
icy
{
τnt , τ
k
t , Tt
}∞
t=1
, a price system {pt, wt, rt}
∞
t=0, and an allocation {ci,t, ni,t,Kt+1}
∞
t=0,
such that: (i) agents choose {ci,t, ni,t}
∞
t=0 to maximize utility subject to budget constraint
(A.2.1) taking policies and prices (that satisfy pt = Rt+1pt+1) as given; (ii) firms max-
imize profits; (iii) the government’s budget constraint (A.2.2) holds; and (iv) markets
clear: the resource constraints (A.2.3) hold.
Given aggregate levels Ct and Nt, individual consumption and labor supply levels
can be found by solving the following static subproblem
Um (Ct, Nt;ϕ) ≡ max
ci,t,ni,t
∑
i
πiϕiu (ci,t, ni,t)
s.t.
∑
i
πici,t = Ct and
∑
i
πieini,t = Nt
where u is given by equation (1.4.1), for some vector ϕ ≡ {ϕi} of market weights ϕi ≥ 0.
Let cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ), and n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) be the argmax of this problem. It can be shown
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that3
cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) = ω
c
iCt + χ
κ
1 + κ
(
(ωni )
1+κ
κ − ωciΩ
n
)
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
nmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) = ω
n
i eiNt
Um (Ct, Nt;ϕ) =
Ωc
1− σ
(
Ct − Ω
nχ
κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)1−σ
Then, implementability constraints can be written as
∞∑
t=0
βt(UmC (Ct, Nt;ϕ) c
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) + U
m
N (Ct, Nt;ϕ)n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)) (A.2.4)
= UmC (C0, N0;ϕ)
(
R0ai,0 + T
1 + τ c
)
for all i ∈ I
Proposition 10 An aggregate allocation {Ct, Nt,Kt+1}
∞
t=0 can be supported by a com-
petitive equilibrium if and only if the resource constraints (A.2.3) hold and there exist
market weights ϕ and a lump-sum tax T so that the implementability conditions (A.2.4)
hold for all i ∈ I. Individual allocations can then be computed using functions cmi,t and
nmi,t, prices and taxes can be computed using the usual equilibrium conditions.
The Ramsey problem is that of choosing policies
{
τnt , τ
k
t , Tt
}∞
t=1
, taking {ai,0}, K0,
B0 and
(
τn0 , τ
k
0 , T0
)
as given, to maximize a weighted sum of the individual utilities,
∞∑
t=0
βtπiλiu (ci,t, ni,t) , (A.2.5)
where {λi} are the welfare weights normalized so that
∑
i πiλi = 1 with λi ≥ 0, subject
to allocations and policies being a part of a competitive equilibrium and τkt ≤ 1 for all
t ≥ 1.
3Where constants are defined as follows:
ωci ≡
(ϕi)
1
σ∑
j
pij (ϕj)
1
σ
, ωni ≡
(ei)
κ∑
j pij (ej)
1+κ , Ω
c ≡
(∑
i
pii (ϕi)
1
σ
)σ
, and Ωn ≡
(∑
j
pij (ej)
1+κ
)
−
1
κ
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First notice that in equilibrium it must be that
UmC (t) = β
(
1 +
(
1− τkt+1
)
rt+1
)
UmC (t+ 1) , (A.2.6)
so that
UmC (t) ≥ βU
m
C (t+ 1) , (A.2.7)
is equivalent to τkt+1 ≤ 1. Moreover, notice that τ
k
0 and T0 have not been substituted
out in the implementability constraint. The fact that τn0 is given together with the
equilibrium condition (1− τn0 )w0 = −U
m
N (0) /U
m
C (0) is equivalent to
N0 = N¯0, (A.2.8)
where N¯0 is defined implicitly as a function of variables given to the Ramsey planner,
(1− τn0 ) fN
(
K0, N¯0
)
= Ωnχ
(
N¯0
) 1
κ .
Finally, we can use Proposition 10 to rewrite the Ramsey problem as that of choosing
{Ct, Nt}
∞
t=0, T , and ϕ to maximize (A.2.5) subject to (A.2.3) for all t ≥ 0, (A.2.4) for
all i ∈ I with multiplier µi, (A.2.7) for all t ≥ 0 with multiplier ηt, and (A.2.8).
Equivalently, we can write it as that of solving the following auxiliary problem
max
{Ct,Nt}
∞
t=0,T,ϕ
∞∑
t=0
βtW (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) − U
m
C (C0, N0;ϕ)
∑
i∈I
µi
(
R0ai,0 + T
1 + τ c
)
,
subject to (A.2.3) for all t ≥ 0, (A.2.7) for all t ≥ 0, and (A.2.8), where
W (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) ≡
∑
i
πi{λiu
(
cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) , n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)
)
+ µi
(
UmC (Ct, Nt;ϕ) c
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) + U
m
N (Ct, Nt;ϕ) n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)
)
}.
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With some algebra it can be shown that4
W (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) =
1
1− σ
(
Ct − Ω
nχ
κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)−σ (
ΦCt − (Φ + (1− σ)Ψ)Ω
nχ
κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)
(A.2.9)
Define R∗t ≡ 1 + rt and
η−1 ≡
R0
β (1 + τ c)
∑
i
πiµiai,0,
and first order conditions (for the following proofs we need only necessary conditions)
together with equilibrium conditions imply the following equations5
∑
i
πiµi = 0 (A.2.10)
τnt + τ
c
1 + τ c
=
ΨΘt
ΦΘt +Ψ(σ +Θt) + Υtσ (βηt−1 − ηt)
, for t ≥ 1 (A.2.11)
Rt+1
R∗t+1
=
ΦΘt+1 +Ψσ +Υt+1σ (βηt − ηt+1)
ΦΘt +Ψσ +Υtσ (βηt−1 − ηt)
Θt
Θt+1
, for t ≥ 0 (A.2.12)
Notice that Υt > 0 and Θt > 0, for all t ≥ 0.
A.2.1 Economy 2
Lemma 3 If ei = 1 for all i ∈ I, then Ψ = 0 and Φ > 0.
4Where constants are defined as follows:
Φ ≡
∑
j
pij
(
λj
ϕj
− σµjω
c
j
)
, and Ψ ≡
Ωc
κ
∑
j
pijµjejω
n
j .
5Where Υt ≡ Ω
c/Ωnχ κ
1+κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ .
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Proof. If ei = 1 for all i ∈ I, then it follows from the definition of Ψ that
Ψ =
Ωc
ε
∑
j πjµj (ej)
1+ε∑
j πj (ej)
1+ε =
Ωc
ε
∑
j πjµj∑
j πj
= 0
where the last equality follows from equation (A.2.10). Next, notice that
u
(
cmi,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ) , n
m
i,t (Ct, Nt;ϕ)
)
=
(ωci )
1−σ
1− σ
(
Ct − Ω
nχ
κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)1−σ
and, therefore, the solution to the problem must satisfy Ct > Ω
nχ κ1+κ (Nt)
1+κ
κ for all
t ≥ 0. Otherwise, the objective function of the Ramsey problem would be −∞. On the
other hand, since Ψ = 0, it follows from equation (A.2.9) that
W (Ct, Nt;ϕ, µ, λ) =
Φ
1− σ
(
Ct − Ω
nχ
κ
1 + κ
(Nt)
1+κ
κ
)1−σ
.
It follows that, if Φ ≤ 0, setting C0 = f
(
K0, N¯0
)
− G, and Ct = Nt = 0, for all t ≥ 1
(so that Ct = Ω
nχ κ1+κ (Nt)
1+κ
κ for all t ≥ 1) would maximize the objective function of
the auxiliary problem while being feasible which is a contradiction.
Proof of Proposition 4. Using Lemma 3, from equation (A.2.11) it follows that
τnt = −τ
c, for t ≥ 1.
Next, suppose ηt = 0, for all t ≥ 0. Then, it follows from (A.2.12) that τ
k
1 < 1 if
−
1
β
ΦΘ0
Υ0σ
≡ P1 < η−1 < M1 ≡
1
β
(R∗1 − 1)ΦΘ0
Υ0σ
,
and that τkt = 0 for t ≥ 2. Hence, if P1 < η−1 < M1, the constraints will in fact never
be binding. Now, suppose ηt > 0, for t ≤ t
∗ − 2 and ηt = 0, for all t ≥ t
∗ − 1, then it
follows from (A.2.12) that τkt∗ < 1 if
−
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
ΦΘτ−1
Υτ−1σ
≡ Pt∗ < η−1 < Mt∗ ≡
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
(∏t∗
t=τ R
∗
t − 1
)
ΦΘτ−1
Υτ−1σ
,
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and that τkt = 0 for t ≥ t
∗ + 1. The result follows from the fact that η−1 is finite,
limt→∞ Pt = −∞ and limt→∞Mt =∞.
A.2.2 Economy 3
Proof of Proposition 5. In this economy there is no heterogeneity in initial levels of
asset, i.e. ai,0 = a0 for all i ∈ I. Then it follows that
η−1 =
R0
β (1 + τ c)
∑
i
πiµiai,0 =
R0
β (1 + τ c)
a0
∑
i
πiµi = 0
where the last equality follows from equation (A.2.10). Since here we assume that τkt
does not have to be bounded by 1, it follows that ηt = 0 for all t ≥ 1. Then, equation
(1.6.1) follows directly from equation (A.2.11), (1.6.2) from its derivative with respect
to Θt, and (1.6.3) from equations (A.2.11) and (A.2.12).
A.2.3 Economy 4
Proof of Proposition 6. Equation (1.6.3) can be established for all t ≥ 1, by substi-
tuting (A.2.11) into (A.2.12). The existence of a t∗ such that ηt > 0, for t < t
∗ − 1 and
ηt = 0, for all t ≥ t
∗ − 1, follows from a very similar logic to the one used in the proof
of Proposition 4, which we suppress here6. Hence, for t ≥ t∗ we can obtain τnt by using
(1.6.1), which follows from (A.2.11) with ηt = 1. For the same time period τ
k
t can then
be found by using (1.6.3). Now, having τnt∗ we can use the fact that τ
k
t = 1 and (1.6.3)
moving backwards to obtain τnt for t < t
∗.
6With
Pt∗ ≡ −
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
ΦΘτ−1 +Ψσ
Υτ−1σ
, and Mt∗ ≡
t∗∑
τ=1
1
βτ
(∏t∗
t=τ R
∗
t − 1
)
ΦΘτ−1 +
(
Θτ−1
Θ
t∗
∏t∗
t=τ R
∗
t − 1
)
Ψσ
Υτ−1σ
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A.3 Welfare decomposition
Let v (x) ≡ u (c, n) where x is the consumption-labor composite defined in Section 1.5.3
and u is defined in (1.4.1). Consider a policy reform. Denote by xRt
(
a0, e
t
)
the equilib-
rium consumption-labor composite path of an agent with initial assets a0 and history of
productivities et if the reform is implemented. Let xNRt
(
a0, e
t
)
be the equilibrium path
in case there is no reform. The average welfare gain, ∆, that results from implementing
the reform is defined as the constant percentage increase to xNRt
(
a0, e
t
)
that equalizes
the (utilitarian) welfare to the value associated with the reform, that is,∫
E0
[
U
(
(1 + ∆)
{
xNRt
(
a0, e
t
)})]
dλ0 (a0, e0) =
∫
E0
[
U
({
xRt
(
a0, e
t
)})]
dλ0 (a0, e0) ,
(A.3.1)
where λ0 is the initial distribution over states (a0, e0) and
U
({
xt
(
a0, e
t
)})
≡
∞∑
t=0
βtv(xt(a0, e
t)) =
∞∑
t=0
βtu
(
ct
(
a0, e
t
)
, nt
(
a0, e
t
))
.
Define
Xjt ≡
∫
xjt
(
a0, e
t
)
dλjt
(
a0, e
t
)
, for j = R,NR.
to be the average level of x at each t. Then, the level effect, ∆L, is
U
(
(1 + ∆L)
{
XNRt
})
= U
({
XRt
})
, (A.3.2)
In order to define the other two components we need some previous definitions. Let
x¯j (a0, e0) denote the individual consumption-labor certainty equivalent,
U
({
x¯j (a0, e0)
})
= E0
[
U
({
xjt
(
a0, e
t
)})]
, for j = R,NR, (A.3.3)
(notice that x¯j (a0, e0) can be chosen to be constant) and let X¯
j be the aggregate
consumption-labor certainty equivalent,
X¯j =
∫
x¯j (a0, e0) dλ (a0, e0) , for j = R,NR. (A.3.4)
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The insurance effect, ∆I , is defined by
1 + ∆I ≡
1− pRunc
1− pNRunc
, where U
((
1− pjunc
) {
Xjt
})
= U
({
X¯j
})
, (A.3.5)
and the redistribution effect, ∆R, by
1 + ∆R ≡
1− pRine
1− pNRine
, where U
((
1− pjine
){
X¯j
})
=
∫
U
({
x¯j (a0, e0)
})
dλ (a0, e0) .
(A.3.6)
The following proposition holds7.
Proof of Proposition 3. First notice that v (x) ≡ u (c, n) where u is the GHH utility
function, defined in (1.4.1), satisfies the following regularity property: there exists a
totally multiplicative function h : (i.e. h (ab) = h (a)h (b), and h (a/b) = h (a) /h (b))
such that for any scalar α,
v (αx) = h (α) v (x) . (A.3.7)
7This result is similar to the one introduced by Benabou (2002) and used in Floden (2001).
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Hence, suppressing the dependence on (a0, e0), we obtain:
∫
E0U
({
xRt
})
dλR0
(A.3.3)
=
∫
U
({
x¯R
})
dλR0
(A.3.6)
= U
((
1− pRine
) {
X¯R
})
(A.3.7)
= h
(
1− pRine
)
U
({
X¯R
}) (A.3.5)
= h
(
1− pRine
)
U
((
1− pRunc
) {
XRt
})
(A.3.7)
= h
((
1− pRine
) (
1− pRunc
))
U
({
XRt
})
(A.3.2)
= h
((
1− pRine
) (
1− pRunc
))
U
(
(1 + ∆L)
{
XNRt
})
(A.3.7)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L)
(
1− pRine
) (
1− pRunc
))
U
({
XNRt
})
(A.3.7)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L)
(
1− pRine
) (1− pRunc)
(1− pNRunc)
)
U
((
1− pNRunc
) {
XNRt
})
(A.3.5)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I)
(
1− pRine
))
U
({
X¯NR
})
(A.3.7)
= h
(
(1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I)
(
1− pRine
)(
1− pNRine
))U ((1− pNRine ) {X¯NR})
(A.3.6)
= h ((1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆R))
∫
U
({
x¯NR
})
dλNR0
(A.3.5)
= h ((1 + ∆L) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆R))
∫
E0U
({
xNRt
})
dλNR0
(A.3.7)
=
∫
E0U
(
(1 + ∆R) (1 + ∆I) (1 + ∆L)
{
xNRt
})
dλNR0 .
The result follows from the definition of ∆ in equation (A.3.1).
A.4 Algorithms
Here we describe the algorithms used to obtain our results.
Algorithm for computing the transition between steady states 8
1. Solve for the initial stationary equilibrium.
2. Assume the economy converges to a new stationary equilibrium in t¯ periods and
guess a sequence K2, ...,Kt¯−1.
8This is an extension of the procedure proposed by Domeij and Heathcote (2004). To solve for
agent’s decision rules we use the endogenous grid method (see Carroll (2006)).
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3. Solve for the new tax on labor such that given K2, ...,Kt¯−1 and the path for the
other taxes, government debt is unchanged between t¯ − 1 and t¯. Compute the
associated path for the government debt, B1, ..., Bt¯−1 (for details see the Final
Tax Computation section in the online appendix).
4. Solve for the final stationary equilibrium given final tax rates τk, τn, τ c and T ,
and Bt¯. Compute Kt¯.
5. Solve for households savings decisions in transition.
6. Update the path of capital, i.e. take the initial stationary distribution over wealth
and productivity and use the decision rules computed above to simulate the econ-
omy forward. Then, check for market clearing at each date and adjustK2, ...,Kt¯−1
appropriately.
7. If the new sequence for capital is the close to the old, we have found the equilibrium
path. Otherwise go back to step 5.
8. Increase t¯ until the solution stops changing.
Algorithm for global optimization9
1. Sample a large set X of points from a uniform distribution over the domain10.
2. Evaluate the objective function for all points in X.
3. Select a reduced set Xr with the highest objective function values. Sort the
elements of Xr into clusters and run a local
11 solver one time for each cluster12.
4. Use a Bayesian stopping rule to determine whether or not the procedure should
be repeated.
9This procedure is described in more detail in Kucherenko and Sytsko (2005).
10We used pseudo-random numbers from a Sobol sequence which give more efficient results.
11We used an open source local solver called BOBYQA.
12See Rinnooy Kan and Timmer (1987).
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A.5 Tables and Figures
Table A.1: Distribution of wealth
Bottom (%) Quintiles Top (%) Gini
0-5 1st 2nd 3rd 4th 5th 95-100
Data -0.1 -0.2 1.1 4.5 11.2 83.4 60.3 0.82
Model -0.1 -0.2 1.5 4.7 10.2 83.4 60.8 0.81
Notes: Data come from the 2007 Survey of the Consumer Finance.
Table A.2: Income sources by quintiles of wealth
Quintile Model Data
Labor Asset Transfer Labor Asset Transfer
1st 83.7 -0.1 16.4 82.0 2.0 16.0
2nd 85.4 1.6 13.1 83.0 4.8 12.2
3rd 84.1 4.7 11.2 80.0 7.3 12.7
4th 81.4 8.6 10.0 77.6 10.3 12.1
5th 58.7 36.2 5.2 51.7 40.0 8.3
Notes: Table summarizes the pre-tax total income decomposition. We define
the asset income as the sum of income from capital and business. Data come
from the 2007 Survey of the Consumer Finance, the numbers are based on a
summary by Dı´az-Gime´nez et al. (2011).
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Figure A.1: Aggregates: Benchmark
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition.
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Figure A.2: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Fixed Capital Taxes
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed capital taxes.
Figure A.3: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Fixed Labor Taxes
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed labor taxes.
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Figure A.4: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Lump-Sum Transfers to Output
(a) Capital tax
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
(b) Labor tax
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
(c) Lump-sum-to-output
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
−0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
(d) Debt-to-output
0 20 40 60 80 100 120
−1.5
−1
−0.5
0
0.5
Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed lump-sum transfers to output ratio.
Figure A.5: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Fixed debt-to-output
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed thin line: initial stationary equilibrium; Dashed thick line: optimal transition with unrestricted
instruments (benchmark); Solid line: optimal transition with fixed debt-to-output ratio.
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Figure A.6: Aggregates: Constant Policy
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition.
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Figure A.7: Optimal Fiscal Policy: Constant Policy
(a) Capital tax
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Notes: Dashed line: initial stationary equilibrium; Solid line: optimal transition; The black dots are the choice
variables: the spline nodes and t∗, the point at which the capital tax leaves the upper bound.
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Appendix B
Appendix to Chapter 2
B.1 Proof of Example Propositions
First I will prove the following proposition which is stronger and encompasses both
Propositions 7 and 8.
Proposition 11 If σθ > ρ (1− ρ)ση, then credit limits are increasing with income, i.e.
ω′ (y1) ≥ 0 for all y1; if σθ < ρ (1− ρ) ση, then credit limits are decreasing with income,
i.e. ω′ (y1) ≤ 0 for all y1; and if σθ = ρ (1− ρ) ση, then credit limits are independent of
income, i.e. ω′ (y1) = 0 for all y1.
Proof. First notice that the income process implies the following conditional distribu-
tions1
y2 | y1 ∼ N
(
ν21y1, χ
2
2
)
, and y3 | (y1, y2) ∼ N
(
ν31y1 + ν32y2, χ
2
3
)
,
1With
ν21 ≡
2σ2θ + ρσ
2
η
σ2θ + σ
2
η
, χ22 ≡
((
ρ2 − 4ρ+ 5
)
σ2θ + σ
2
η
)
σ2η
σ2θ + σ
2
η
,
ν31 ≡
(1− ρ)2 (3− 2ρ) σ2θ
(ρ2 − 4ρ+ 5) σ2θ + σ
2
η
, ν32 ≡
(
ρ3 − 2ρ2 − 2ρ+ 6
)
σ2θ + ρσ
2
η
(ρ2 − 4ρ+ 5) σ2θ + σ
2
η
, and
χ23 ≡
((
5ρ2 − 16ρ + 14
)
σ2θ + σ
2
η
)
σ2η
(ρ2 − 4ρ+ 5) σ2θ + σ
2
η
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where ν21, ν31, and ν32 are strictly positive. The necessary and sufficient first order
conditions of problems (2.2.2) and (2.2.3) lead to the following policy functions
a03 (a2, y1, y2) =
1 + r
2 + r
(
(1− ν32) y2 − ν31y1 + a2 +
αχ2
2
)
,
and
a13 (y1, y2) = max
{
a03 (0, y1, y2) , 0
}
.
It follows that
V 0 (a2, y1, y2) = − (1 + β) exp
(
−
α
2 + r
(
ν31y1 + (1 + r + ν32) y2 + (1 + r) a2 −
αχ23
2
))
,
(B.1.1)
and that
V 1 (y1, y2) = − exp
(
−
α
2 + r
min
{
ν31y1 + (1 + r + ν32) y2 −
αχ23
2
, (2 + r) y2
})
(B.1.2)
−β exp
(
−
α
2 + r
(
max
{
ν31y1 + (1 + r + ν32) y2 −
αχ23
2
,
(2 + r) (ν31y1 + ν32y2)− (2 + r)
αχ23
2
}))
.
Next, define the threshold a∗2 (y1, y2) to be such that
V 0 (a∗2 (y1, y2) , y1, y2) = V
1 (y1, y2) ,
that is, a∗2 (y1, y2) is the lowest level of asset (or highest amount of debt) that a household
can start period 2 with and not declare bankruptcy2. If a2 < a
∗
2 (y1, y2), the household
declares bankruptcy, and if a2 ≥ a
∗
2 (y1, y2), it does not. Using equations (B.1.1) and
(B.1.2) we can explicitly solve for a∗2 (y1, y2), which implies
a∗2 (y1, y2) =


0 , if (1− ν32) y2 ≥ ν31y1 −
αχ23
2
Ω (y1, y2) , if (1− ν32) y2 < ν31y1 −
αχ23
2
(B.1.3)
2It is easy to see that V 0 (a2, y1, y2) is increasing in a2 so that a
∗
2 (y1, y2) is uniquely defined.
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where
Ω (y1, y2) ≡ −
ν31y1 − (1− ν32) y2 −
αχ23
2
1 + r
−
2 + r
1 + r
1
α
ln

1 + β exp
(
−α
(
ν31y1 − (1− ν32) y2 −
αχ23
2
))
1 + β

 .
For what follows, it will be useful to define
yˆ2 ≡
ν31y1
(1− ν32)
−
αχ23
2 (1− ν32)
,
and let Φ (·) and φ (·) denote the cumulative distribution and density of a N (0, 1)
random variable, respectively. Further, define y∗2 (a2, y1) to be such that
a∗2 (y1, y
∗
2 (a2, y1)) = a2, for all a2 < 0.
Given a2 and y1, y
∗
2 (a2, y1) is the level of income in period 2 that would leave the house-
hold indifferent between declaring bankruptcy or not. Now, consider the following two
(exhaustive) possibilities.
Case 1: σ2θ <
(1−ρ)
1+ρ(1−ρ)(2−ρ)σ
2
η, so that ν32 < 1.
From equation (B.1.3) it follows that
∂a∗2 (y1, y2)
∂y1
=


0 , if y2 ≥ yˆ2
− ν311+rΛ (y1, y2) < 0 , if y2 < yˆ2
∂a∗2 (y1, y2)
∂y2
=


0 , if y2 ≥ yˆ2
1−ν32
1+r Λ (y1, y2) > 0 , if y2 < yˆ2
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where
Λ (y1, y2) ≡
1− exp
(
−α
(
ν31y1 − (1− ν32) y2 −
αχ23
2
))
1 + β exp
(
−α
(
ν31y1 − (1− ν32) y2 −
αχ23
2
)) > 0.
Consider an a2 < 0 and notice that y
∗
2 (a2, y1) < yˆ2. Thus, from the implicit function
theorem it follows that
∂y∗2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
=
ν31
1− ν32
.
Equation (2.2.1) implies that
q2 (a2, y1) =
1− Pr (y2 > y
∗
2 (a2, y1) | y1)
1 + r
,
and, therefore
q2 (a2, y1) =
Φ
(
y∗2(a2,y1)−ν21y1
χ2
)
1 + r
,
which entails
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
=
φ
(
y∗2(a2,y1)−ν21y1
χ2
)
1 + r
ν31
1−ν32
− ν21
χ2
.
Then, using the definitions of the conditional distribution parameters, it can be estab-
lished3 that
σ2θ < ρ (1− ρ) σ
2
η ⇒
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
< 0,
σ2θ = ρ (1− ρ) σ
2
η ⇒
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
= 0,
σ2θ > ρ (1− ρ) σ
2
η ⇒
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
> 0.
Finally, recall that credit limits are defined as ω (y1) = maxa2 (−q2 (a2, y1) a2), which
implies the envelope condition
ω′ (y1) = −
∂q2 (a˜2 (y1) , y1)
∂y1
a˜2 (y1) ,
3Notice that ρ (1− ρ) < (1−ρ)
1+ρ(1−ρ)(2−ρ)
.
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where a˜2 (y1) = argmaxa2 (−q2 (a2, y1) a2). Since q2 (a2, y1) ≥ 0, it follows that a˜2 (y1) ≤
0 and, therefore
σ2θ < ρ (1− ρ) σ
2
η ⇒ ω
′ (y1) ≤ 0,
σ2θ = ρ (1− ρ) σ
2
η ⇒ ω
′ (y1) = 0,
σ2θ > ρ (1− ρ) σ
2
η ⇒ ω
′ (y1) ≥ 0.
Case 2: σ2θ >
(1−ρ)
1+ρ(1−ρ)(2−ρ)σ
2
η, so that ν32 > 1.
Analogously to Case 1, it can be established that
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
= −
φ
(
y∗2(a2,y1)−ν21y1
χ2
)
1 + r
ν31
1−ν32
− ν21
χ2
and it follows straight-forwardly that
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
> 0,
which, in turn, implies that ω′ (y1) ≥ 0 by the same argument used in Case 1.
Case 3: σ2θ =
(1−ρ)
1+ρ(1−ρ)(2−ρ)σ
2
η, so that ν32 = 1.
From equation (B.1.3) it follows that
a∗2 (y1) =


0 , if y1 ≤
αχ23
2ν31
Φ (y1) , if y1 >
αχ23
2ν31
where
Φ (y1) ≡ −
ν31y1 −
αχ23
2
1 + r
−
2 + r
1 + r
1
α
ln

1 + β exp
(
−α
(
ν31y1 −
αχ23
2
))
1 + β

 .
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Equation (2.2.1) implies that
q2 (a2, y1) =


0 , if a2 < a
∗
2 (y1)
1
1+r , if a2 ≥ a
∗
2 (y1)
and, therefore, in effect
ω (y1) = −
a∗2 (y1)
1 + r
.
Finally, it follows that
ω′ (y1) =


0 , if y1 ≤
αχ23
2ν31
−Φ
′(y1)
1+r , if y1 >
αχ23
2ν31
where
Φ′ (y1) =
ν31
1 + r
exp
(
−α
(
ν31y1 −
αχ23
2
))
− 1
1 + β exp
(
−α
(
ν31y1 −
αχ23
2
)) < 0, if y1 > αχ23
2ν31
which implies that ω′ (y1) ≥ 0.
Next, I will present the proof of Proposition 9.
Proof of Proposition 9. If σθ = 0, then the conditional distributions become
y2 | y1 ∼ N
(
ρy1, σ
2
η
)
, and y3 | (y1, y2) ∼ N
(
ρy2, σ
2
η
)
,
so that, in fact, V 0 (a2, y1, y2) and V˜
1 (y1, y2) do not depend on y1 (thus, this argument
will be suppressed from now on). Then, following the same steps contained in the
beginning of the previous proof and defining a∗2 (y2) to be such that
V 0 (a∗2 (y2) , y2) = V˜
1 (y2) ,
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we obtain
a∗2 (y2) =

 −
1+r+ρ
1+r γy2 , if y2 ≥ −
ασ2η
2(1−γ)(1−ρ)
−1+r+ρ1+r γy2 +Ω(y2) , if y2 < −
ασ2η
2(1−γ)(1−ρ)
where
Ω (y2) ≡
(1− ρ) (1− γ) y2 +
ασ2η
2
1 + r
−
2 + r
1 + r
1
α
ln

1 + β exp
(
α
(
(1− ρ) (1− γ) y2 +
ασ2η
2
))
1 + β

 .
It follows that
∂a∗2 (y2)
∂y2
=


−1+r+ρ1+r γ , if y2 ≥ yˆ2
−1+r+ρ1+r γ +
(1−ρ)(1−γ)
1+r Λ (y2) , if y2 < yˆ2
where
Λ (y2) ≡
1− exp
(
α
(
(1− ρ) (1− γ) y2 +
ασ2η
2
))
1 + β exp
(
α
(
(1− ρ) (1− γ) y2 +
ασ2η
2
)) .
Notice that
max
y2<−
ασ2η
2(1−γ)(1−ρ)
Λ (y2) = 1,
so that
∂a∗2 (y2)
∂y2
< 0 for all y2 ⇐⇒ γ ≥
1− ρ
1 + β
.
Case 1 γ ≥ 1−ρ1+β .
Define y∗2 (a2) to be such that
a∗2 (y
∗
2 (a2)) = a2, for all a2 < 0.
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for any a2 < 0. Equation (2.2.1), then, implies that
q2 (a2, y1) =
1− Pr (y2 < y
∗
2 (a2) | y1)
1 + r
,
and, therefore
q2 (a2, y1) =
1− Φ
(
y∗2(a2)−ρy1
ση
)
1 + r
,
which entails
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
=
φ
(
y∗2(a2)−ρy1
ση
)
1 + r
ρ
ση
> 0.
Hence, from the definition of credit limits we have that
ω′ (y1) = −
∂q2 (a˜2 (y1) , y1)
∂y1
a˜2 (y1) ,
where a˜2 (y1) = argmaxa2 (−q2 (a2, y1) a2). Since q2 (a2, y1) ≥ 0, it follows that a˜2 (y1) ≤
0 and, therefore ω′ (y1) ≥ 0.
Case 2 γ < 1−ρ1+β .
In this case, there exists y¯2 such that a
∗
2 (y2) is increasing for y2 < y¯2 and decreas-
ing for y2 > y¯2. Hence, there exists an interval (a2, a¯2) such that, a
∗
2 (y2) = a2 has two
solutions in y2, for all a2 ∈ (a2, a¯2). For any a2 ∈ (a2, a¯2), denote the two solutions by
y∗
2
(a2) and y¯
∗
2 (a2) with y
∗
2
(a2) < y¯
∗
2 (a2). It follows that,
q2 (a2, y1) =
1− Pr
(
y∗
2
(a2) < y2 < y¯
∗
2 (a2) | y1
)
1 + r
, for all a2 ∈ (a2, a¯2) ,
which implies
q2 (a2, y1) =
1−
(
Φ
(
y¯∗2(a2)−ρy1
ση
)
− Φ
(
y∗
2
(a2)−ρy1
ση
))
1 + r
, for all a2 ∈ (a2, a¯2) ,
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and therefore
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
=
φ
(
y¯∗2(a2)−ρy1
ση
)
− φ
(
y∗
2
(a2)−ρy1
ση
)
1 + r
ρ
ση
, for all a2 ∈ (a2, a¯2) ,
so that, if y1 is close to y
∗
2
(a2) it follows that
∂q2 (a2, y1)
∂y1
< 0,
and, again, from the definition of ω (y1) we obtain ω (y1) < 0 for some y1.
B.2 Figures
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Figure B.2
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Figure B.4
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